The Pax Americana seems to be ending. The fate of Ukraine — of Israel and Taiwan, too — hangs in the balance. I cannot say I am surprised. It was always very likely that the overreach of the Global War on Terror would be requited in this way: with a resurgence of isolationism.…
- I took (and still hold) the now heretical position that most history is the history of empires; that no empire is without its injustices and cruelties; but that the English-speaking empires were, in net terms, preferable for the world to the plausible alternatives, then and now.
<> However, I was skeptical about the neoconservative project to reorder the “Greater Middle East” under the cover of a “Global War on Terror” in retaliation for 9/11.
- I particularly doubted that the United States would be able to achieve its goals of transforming the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq into its allies — or at least satellites.
- Had Britain’s imperialists succeeded in taming the wild lands north of the Khyber Pass — much less ancient Mesopotamia?
<> The reasons for my skepticism were what I called the “three deficits” of America’s strange empire that dared not speak its own name.
- The first was the economic deficit ...
- The second was the manpower deficit ...
- Finally, and most importantly, there was the attention deficit.
- All…
<> American loss of interest has been followed almost immediately by Ukrainian shortages of materiel. Kyiv barely has sufficient long-range strike weaponry, artillery ammunition and air defense systems to cope with the brutal Russian air offensive now underway
<> EU leaders recognize that Donald Trump could win the US presidential election next year, with dire implications for the transatlantic alliance generally and Ukraine specifically. But they seem to have no clue what to do about this
- First, more refugees will flow from Ukraine to Europe ...
- Second, private investors will be even less likely…
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". . .The lesson of history is that when such commitments are made, it is extremely hazardous not to sustain them. If, in the course of 2024, Ukraine’s position becomes so vulnerable that its forces must withdraw from some contested territory, three immediate consequences will follow.
First, more refugees will flow from Ukraine to Europe. There are currently 4.5 million Ukrainian refugees, most of them in EU countries and the UK. Even though many have found jobs, each refugee costs the host countries on average roughly €1,075 per month. If another 4.5 million more Ukrainians flee as Russia advances, it would cost another €58 billion.
Second, private investors will be even less likely to risk their money on Ukraine. The country’s bonds are already down significantly since the failure of the summer counter-offensive.
Finally, if they are to arm themselves to deter an emboldened Russia that already shares borders with five EU members (plus Norway, which is in NATO but not the EU), European governments will have to get a lot more serious about their defense spending, with all the obvious political headaches that implies. Between 1949 and 1989 — during the First Cold War — NATO’s European members spent up to 5.8% of GDP on defense. That was the British figure. The French equivalent was 5.1%. The West German was 3.6%. In 2022 those shares were 2.1% (UK), 1.9% (France) and 1.4% (Germany). For these countries to return their defense budgets to their Cold War shares of GDP would require a colossal effort. It would mean around $124 billion more per year for the UK, $97 billion for France, and $96 billion for Germany. For NATO as a whole to hit 3.5% of GDP on defense spending would require $431 billion more per year — nearly twice the amount all countries have pledged to Ukraine since last year ($247 billion).
The pax americana seems to be ending. The fate of Ukraine — of Israel and Taiwan, too — hangs in the balance. I cannot say I am surprised. It was always very likely that the overreach of the Global War on Terror would be requited in this way: with a resurgence of isolationism. Today, fully 57% of Republican voters, and 51% of Independents, say that “US interests are better served by using our resources to improve life for ordinary Americans at home.” Just a third agree that “US interests are best served by supporting freedom and democracy around the world when they are under threat.”
I am with the minority on this question. Let’s hope we don’t get vindicated the hard way."
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(Corrects 16th paragraph in article published on Dec. 31 to clarify that Germany has sent more than one Patriot battery to Ukraine.)
To contact the author of this story:
Niall Ferguson at nferguson23@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
James Gibney at jgibney5@bloomberg.net
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