The geopolitical fault lines of the 21st. Century are increasingly similar to those of the Cold War – with interchanged roles for Beijing and Moscow. But what exactly does that mean for the West?
China and the United States approached in the 1970s, and today the course is on Détente. Image: Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai 1971 at a state banquet in Beijing.
The word « Détente » became internationally known when Henry Kissinger – first promoted – as security advisor, then as foreign minister <TAG1>, which would later be remembered as his geopolitical policy program: the reduction of tensions between the USSR and the USA.
For Kissinger, détente was a middle ground. For him, it stood between the aggressiveness that led to the First World War – when Europe drifted « into a war that nobody wanted » –, and the appeasement policy before the Second World War. In his opinion, the latter had led to the conflict; the democracies would not have understood « the plans of a totalitarian aggressor ».
Mutual as a basis
At the same time, Kissinger was ready to show harshness. Whenever the Soviets tried to expand their sphere of influence, for example in the Middle East or in the sub-Saharan region, the United States opposed them. In other words (and as Kissinger himself put it): relaxation meant « both deterrence and coexistence, both containment and relaxation effort ».
If this pragmatic feeling reverberates five decades later, it is because political decision-makers in Washington appear to have reached a similar conclusion regarding China. President Joe Biden and his national security team appear to be ready to try their own version of the Détente. The United States and China are rivals, but the nuclear age and climate change, not to mention artificial intelligence, are forcing them to coexist.
Reagan's criticism of the Détente
Reagan was no exception. In the late 1970s, American hawks were fed up with Kissinger's approach. The Republicans generally complained that, as their Senator Clifford Case said, the Soviet side alone benefits from détente. And Democratic Senator Robert Byrd accused Kissinger of placing « great trust » in Communist Russia and hugging Moscow « ». Just as appeasement, which was initially considered a respectable term, fell into disrepute from 1938, Détente became a dirty word – even before Kissinger left office.
But the core of Kissinger's strategic concept bore fruit years later. Reagan took over the détente policy along the entire length – he only avoided naming it by name. In some things, he even went beyond Kissinger. In 1987, the latter warned Reagan that America was going too far in the negotiations. Reagan's Foreign Minister George Shultz gave the insightful answer that « is beyond Détente ».
Origin of the American Détente
Kissinger campaigned for relaxation, even though he knew the Kremlin would pursue its own plans. The reason was simple: the alternative, a constant atomic edge response as in the 1950s and 1960s (brinkmanship), risked a nuclear Armageddon. There is « no alternative to coexistence », Kissinger said in 1975 to an audience in Minneapolis.
But Détente did not mean – as critics claimed – to trust or appease the Soviets. Relaxation did not mean allowing them nuclear superiority, constant control over Eastern Europe or an empire in the Third World. The aim was to recognize American power as limited, to reduce the risk of nuclear war using carrot and stick –, and to give the United States time to recover.
It worked. The detente enabled America to reform itself domestically and to stabilize the international situation. The economy soon developed in a way that the Soviet Union was denied. This created economic and technological advantages, and in the long run they enabled Washington to win the Cold War.
The détente policy also gave the Soviets the opportunity to set a trap for themselves. Encouraged by successes in Southeast Asia and Africa, Communist Russia forced a series of senseless and costly interventions that culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
Lessons for relations with China
In view of the (still too little appreciated) success of the Détente, it is worth asking: can lessons be learned from it that are relevant to competition with China?
Kissinger himself clearly believed this. During a speech in Beijing in 2019, he said that the United States and China were « in the promontory of a cold war ». In 2020, in the middle of the pandemic, he already spoke of « pass heights ». And a year before his death in 2023, Kissinger warned that the new cold war would be more dangerous than the first. Technological advances like AI could give weapons more autonomy. Kissinger called on both superpowers to limit the existential dangers – and in particular a potentially catastrophic showdown to avoid the controversial status of Taiwan.
As in the 1970s, this approach is criticized by many experts in the current debate. Even the most thoughtful in the new generation of conservative strategists, Elbridge Colby, has asked Biden to pursue a « strategy of prevention » towards China. It is intended to prevent the People's Republic from militarily challenging the status quo in which Taiwan has de facto autonomy. In general, there is almost a complete consensus across parties that one has been wrong: trade with China is not a magic tool that leads to a change in the political system.
However, there is no reason why we should endure the Brinkmanship again for twenty years before a period of relaxation occurs. A Détente 2.0 would certainly be preferable to a new edition of a Cuban crisis; this time the roles would be distributed differently: the communist state would cordon off the controversial island near it, the United States would try, break the blockade – with all associated risks.
Diplomacy is required
This diplomatic effort would drag on and be tedious. It is quite possible that it would not lead to a useful result. But it would be a negotiation in which « meets pine », as Winston Churchill used to say. As for Taiwan, the superpowers could do worse than revive their old promise made by Kissinger: agree not to agree.
However, it must be clear that the Détente is not a miracle cure. In the 1970s, too much was promised about her, and she tried too often. As a strategy, it undoubtedly gave the United States time. However, it was also a move that perhaps sacrificed too cold-blooded figures on the board that appeared less central.
New name under Biden
The starting point of the new cold war is different; only because of the much stronger economic integration between the superpowers. However, it could turn out that the optimal strategy under today's conditions is essentially the same as that in the 20th. Century.
Anyone who criticizes the new detente against China should be careful not to repeat the mistakes that Kissinger's contemporaries often made: Again and again they misrepresented the Détente 1.0. However, as – as Ronald Reagan – once did, you run the risk of pursuing the same strategy in an emergency.
Niall Ferguson is a Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution in Stanford and was a professor at Harvard. The above essay was published in the American magazine « Foreign Affairs » – and is published here exclusively in the German-speaking world. – From the English by mml.
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