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Chiang_Kai-shek_Colour

Chiang Kai-Shek

Forty years ago, Chiang Kai-Shek died after a half-century on the international stage. For the last 26 years of his life, Chiang ruled over a domain which had shrunk from the most populous country in the world to the offshore island of Taiwan. Sustained in power by the United States, this apparent client-dependency relationship was not at all straightforward. Almost every strategy and policy considered or enacted by either party was influenced by the perceived effect upon, or reaction of, the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, in the case of the USA the repercussions upon her relationship with the Soviet Union, and upon Sino-Soviet relations, played a part in decision-making. Although both the United States and Chiang Kai-Shek’s Republic of China (ROC) embodied solidly and stridently anti-communist doctrines throughout the period 1949-1975, they often did so for very different reasons. Among the most fundamental of these was the very question of whether one China or two should exist on the world stage. For the USA this was a political and geostrategic issue, but for Chiang and the Kuomintang it was an existential one, defining their very raison d’être. They had absolutely no desire for genuine de jure independence from mainland China, thus creating the peculiar situation of being a state which was not a nation, yet was not only a member of the United Nations, but also had a permanent seat on the Security Council until 1971.

From 1945 until 1975 (and beyond), American foreign policy was driven in very large measure by an anti-communist ideological imperative. Defined by President Truman’s Containment Doctrine in 1947 and reinforced in 1954 by President Eisenhower’s Domino Theory, it was the guiding star and prism through which all decision-making passed. Communism was accepted as a real and immediate threat to the existence of the USA and the “free world” by every successive president until the collapse of the Soviet Union. No distinction was made between differing interpretations of communist ideology or the particular national situations which shaped communist policies in different countries. Above all, the USA clung to the wrong-headed belief until deep into the Korean War that the PRC was a satellite state of the Soviet Union, by which time this belief had led it to make all sorts of counter-productive decisions in its dealings with Mao Zedong’s China.[1] Whether the threat of Soviet or communist global expansionism was real or not, the fact that it was believed by those who made policy was sufficient to create the self-fulfilling prophecy of a global struggle between two competing ideologies which produced the Cold War. The United States saw this struggle as so fundamental and crucial that it swung dangerously towards an acceptance of the doctrine of the ends justifying the means. It certainly led to repeated cases of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”, causing the USA to back such unsavoury figures as General Suharto in Indonesia, Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam and Manuel Noriega in Panama, and later the Mujahideen in Afghanistan who gave rise to the Taliban. Arguably this was also the case in its support for Chiang Kai-Shek.

The United States had long harboured a desire to break into the Chinese market which it saw as potentially lucrative. Disguised as a doctrine seeking to maintain Chinese sovereignty and prevent its partition, the Open Door Policy was still cherished in the early 1940s by President Roosevelt who hoped to see China enrolled as a client state in a post-war world order. Although Roosevelt did not foresee a role for China as a bastion against a Bolshevik world takeover, even at this stage Chiang was deeply involved in his own battle against Mao’s communist forces, a civil war which had dragged on since 1927. So intent was he upon defeating the “enemy within”, that 500,000 of his best troops who could have been used to fight the Japanese invaders were blockading the communists in Shaanxi province – despite the fact that Mao’s forces were also fighting the Japanese. In spite of being given hundreds of millions of dollars in loans, vast amounts of equipment and American air support, Chiang still refused to commit all but a small proportion of his military forces to the fight against what the Americans viewed as the “real” enemy. On the political front, Roosevelt pledged US support for the return of all lands occupied by Japan – including Formosa/Taiwan which had been a Japanese colony since being taken from China in the war of 1895.[2]

Even at this very early stage of US-Kuomintang relations, we can see that Chiang was willing and able to take what he could from the Americans while offering little in return. When the perceptive General Joe Stilwell, American Commander-in-Chief in the China and India theatre, confronted him with a demand for more action, Chiang succeeded in getting him removed by obliquely threatening to conclude a separate peace with the Japanese.[3]

Chiang Kai-Shek, Meiling Soong & Joe Stilwell

Chiang Kai-Shek, Meiling Soong & Joe Stilwell

Stilwell’s replacement in dealings with the Kuomintang leader was much more to Chiang’s liking. Ambassador Patrick Hurley was bluff and brash, but intellectually out of his depth. Despite apparent evidence pointing to the value of Mao’s resistance to the Japanese and despite Hurley’s own staff recognising the need to work with the communists and pointing out the corruption and ineffectiveness of the Kuomintang, the ambassador was taken in by Chiang and supported his case for not forming a united front against the Japanese. Historians disagree over the actual extent and effectiveness of communist resistance to the Japanese and whether Mao was similarly holding back his forces to strike against the Kuomintang when the war ended, but they agree that Chiang manipulated individual Americans and deftly exploited divisions among his US allies.[4]

Following the surrender of Japan, President Truman attempted, through the offices of General George Marshall, to mediate a ceasefire in the still-smouldering civil war and if possible negotiate a coalition government encompassing both Nationalists and Communists. This proved hopeless in the face of the intransigence of Chiang, and when he sent a large Kuomintang force into communist-controlled Manchuria, full-scale civil war erupted. The USA reluctantly threw in on Chiang’s side and supplied him with $3 billion of aid over the next four years. Despite this, Chiang proved to be an incompetent commander-in-chief and poor political leader. Defeat after defeat occurred as a result of inept strategy, while corruption and a total failure to implement desperately needed land reform drove not just disgruntled peasants into the communist camp, but also thousands of defectors from his own army. By 1949 and the victory of Mao, both Truman and his secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had come to despise Chiang and see him as a near-hopeless case. As for Chiang, he had come to view the USA as a nation which could not be trusted ever since Marshall’s attempt to negotiate détente and cooperation in 1945-46.. ." READ MORE