Tuesday, October 21, 2025

NO SHAKE: Brussels's “Plan B” on Ukraine hides a deeper problem: Europe's lack of will

INTRO:

Faced with Hungary’s veto on opening accession talks with Ukraine, the European Commission has floated a “Plan B” – a workaround that would allow the EU to move ahead with technical or parallel steps, even without Budapest’s consent.

To supporters, this is a clever solution to a familiar problem: how to stop one spoiler from holding the rest hostage. Yet in truth, the plan reveals something more uncomfortable: the EU does not lack enlargement procedures, but political courage to use them.

Delay as a policy
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, member states have declared enlargement a geopolitical imperative. They invoked Kyiv’s struggle as Europe’s own and insisted that the Western Balkans not be left behind. But when rhetoric meets reality, enthusiasm fades.

There is a quiet reluctance to integrate new members which no amount of bureaucratic creativity can disguise.

Brussels’s “Plan B” on Ukraine hides a deeper problem: Europe’s lack of will

Oct 21, 2025

> Old habits rebranded

Nor is this “technical approach” new.

For decades, the dossier has advanced mostly through procedural tinkering – reshuffled chapters, revised methodologies, dialogue formats – designed to show movement without committing to new entries.
Each reaffirmed the same lesson: no procedural creativity can replace political will.

To be sure, the Commission’s tactical improvisations were born out of frustration with fickle member states and concern over the corrosive effects of an unfulfilled policy. Yet the process only continued in fits and starts, sustained by technocratic management rather than political leadership.

Plan B would simply rebrand that dynamic.

Blame beyond Budapest

The Union’s neighbours do not need another creative pathway. They need proof that the EU will deliver enlargement. If the Union cannot persuade one of its own to lift a veto, it reveals profound political weakness.

Genuine commitment to enlargement has been missing for years.
Even before Hungary’s obstruction, many were ambivalent.
Some fear public opinion; others that newcomers would stretch the EU’s budget, dilute cohesion or demand reform.
Orbán’s veto is not an exception but the symptom of a deeper problem.
To treat Budapest as the sole obstacle is to let everyone else off the hook.

A ritual of reassurances

The Commission’s autumn enlargement package will again expose this hypocrisy. Brussels will acknowledge Ukraine’s reforms, Moldova’s progress and the Western Balkans’ frustrations. If the long-awaited policy reviews are adopted alongside these reports, the Commission should also outline how the EU must prepare for future enlargements.

Yet without political will in the Council, these documents will prove aspirational rather than actionable.

Plan B fits neatly into that pattern. It allows the EU to claim momentum while avoiding a deeper reckoning: how to muster consensus behind a shared vision of Europe’s future and reform the EU’s institutions, budget and decision-making accordingly. Take Antonio Costa’s failed push for qualified majority voting. But enlargement and reform must advance together. Tactical workarounds achieve neither.

The real test of times

The timing is critical. Europe’s security order is being reshaped by Russia’s war, US political uncertainty and China’s assertive diplomacy. Enlargement is no longer a bureaucratic exercise; it is the EU’s decisive geopolitical tool. Whether the Union expands or stagnates will determine its ability to shape its neighbourhood, protect its values and remain a credible global actor. The same goes for internal reform: without a more agile budget and decision-making system, the EU lacks both the capacity to enlarge and to confront the age of permacrisis.

There is also the question of fairness. For the Western Balkans, Plan B would confirm what many in the region already suspect – that enlargement has become a tool of geopolitical competition rather than a merit-based process. Reform momentum will be harder to sustain in countries that have spent decades fulfilling EU conditions, often at great political cost, with outcomes that fell short of expectations. For the laggards, this perception risks feeding cynicism and illiberalism.

None of this diminishes Ukraine’s extraordinary case or its right to a European future. But if the EU truly believes that Ukraine belongs in Europe, it must show that conviction openly, not through procedural sleight of hand. That means confronting the hard choices: treaty reform, budget adaptation and institutional redesign.

History shows that enlargement succeeds with genuine political will. It was political courage, not bureaucratic invention, that opened the doors to Central and Eastern Europe in the 2000s. It was consensus, not cleverness, that reunited the continent.

Plan B may allow Brussels to claim short-term progress, but the test of our times is not whether the Commission can engineer a workaround. It is whether member states can choose between enlargement by exception or enlargement by reform. The future of the EU itself depends on that answer.

Corina Stratulat is an Associate Director and Head of the European Politics and Institutions Programme at the European Policy Centre.

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