Setting up the groundwork:
Logistics for the Press Trip
Press corps chaos over Vietnam trip
Welcome to POLITICO’s West Wing Playbook, your guide to the people and power centers in the Biden administration. With help from producer Ben Johansen
It was the first time that reporters were hearing of the foreign trip. Even the president’s aides were surprised. Although West Wing officials had been discussing a potential visit, nothing had been finalized.
The president has a habit of revealing information that his aides would prefer he not make public in the more relaxed settings of private fundraisers.
- This time, however, Biden’s unplanned comments ignited a logistical nightmare.
- Almost immediately, reporters began peppering the White House for details. But aides couldn’t offer much guidance with logistics still being figured out.
- They signaled the Vietnam stop would be tacked on to the end of Biden’s September trip to New Delhi for the annual G-20 meeting, but revealed little else.
- Reporters who had been assigned to cover the G-20 were left with uncertain travel plans and a host of questions.
- Should they also plan to fly to Hanoi?
- Would it be before or after New Delhi?
- Would they have enough time to get a visa to Vietnam?
- And how would Biden make it back to the U.S. in time to commemorate the 22nd anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks?
When the White House formally announced the trip on Aug. 28, it became clear that the press corps wouldn’t be able to cover both the India and Vietnam stops without a charter flight, given the president’s tight schedule and limited commercial options from Delhi to Hanoi. So the White House Correspondents’ Association got to work organizing a charter option.
Charter planes are incredibly expensive (a seat on a 2014 charter plane to cover President BARACK OBAMA’s 9-day Asia trip cost a staggering $60,000 per person) and have been used increasingly less by the press over the past few years as newsrooms tighten their budgets.
- Many media outlets were leery about spending thousands of dollars to get to Vietnam, especially after Biden abruptly cut short an overseas trip in May that left newsrooms on the hook for the cost of a charter flight from Japan to Australia that they never actually took.
But the dynamic shifted once the White House announced that Biden would hold a press conference in Hanoi rather than New Delhi, as the press corps had expected. That made the Vietnam trip much more newsworthy to outlets — and WHCA officers made another effort to revive the charter. They texted reporters, nudging them to lobby their editors to sign off on the expensive flight.
To many journalists, the White House’s decision to host the press conference in Hanoi was a blatant way to entice them to cover the Vietnam stop. And ultimately, it worked. Although the charter price had gone up, enough seats were taken to commission the flight.
The White House pushed back on the notion that any changes made to the press conference were intended to ensure coverage of the president’s Vietnam stop. As one White House official pointed out, the president typically holds a press conference at the end of foreign trips so he can address everything that has happened.
- The official also said that the White House never confirmed there would be a press conference in India and noted it was normal for elements of a trip to become more locked in once it gets closer.
Some outlets that have traditionally been a part of presidential overseas visits ultimately still opted out of joining the Vietnam leg of the trip.
SPEAKING OF THAT TRIP: Biden was leaving Thursday afternoon for New Delhi to attend the G-20, where he will sell an American-led global alliance in contrast with one influenced by China and its slumping economy. The president plans to hold a bilat Friday with Indian Prime Minister NARENDRA MODI, who was fêted at the White House in June with a state dinner amid criticism over human rights abuses in his country. Biden was also expected to speak with Saudi Crown Prince MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN as part of an effort to normalize Saudi relations with Israel. Our ALEX WARD and JONATHAN LEMIRE have the details.
PRIMETIME SUNDAY SPOT: The Biden campaign on Thursday released an ad touting the president’s surprise visit to Ukraine earlier this year. The spot will air in battleground states during this weekend’s “60 Minutes” broadcast, NBC News’ MIKE MEMOLI reports. “In the middle of a war zone, Joe Biden showed the world what America is made of,” a narrator says.
The new ad comes as Biden prepares to wrestle with Congress over additional funding for Ukraine.
But the subtext of the spot is clearly Biden’s age or, rather, the campaign’s attempt to show his vitality. The narrator, for example, mentions just how many hours he stayed on that train into Kyiv.
Jake Sullivan Press Conference:
Building on President Biden’s string of diplomatic successes in the Indo-Pacific just this year, this visit is a remarkable step in the strengthening of our diplomatic ties, and it reflects the leading role that Vietnam will play in our growing network of partnerships in the Indo-Pacific as we look to the future.
- For decades, the U.S. and Vietnam have worked to overcome a painful shared legacy of the Vietnam War, working hand in hand to promote reconciliation, with our service members and veterans lighting the way — work that is dear to the President’s heart, particularly in light of his close friendship with Senator John McCain.
- And finally, Vice President Harris will be traveling — is traveling, literally, as we speak — to Jakarta, Indonesia, to attend the U.S.-ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit and to engage with leaders from across the Indo-Pacific from September 5th to September 7th.
And throughout her work, she has focused on strengthening alliances and partnerships, driving economic growth in the United States, and upholding international rules and norms.
- At both summits, the Vice President will underscore the United States’ enduring commitment to the Indo-Pacific generally and to ASEAN centrality specifically. And we look forward to having her be able to report back to the President on those trips as the President embarks on his own trip to India and Vietnam.
Yeah. . .
Q And just one more. On Sunday, the President said he was disappointed that President Xi was not going to be attending the G20. But then he said, “I’m going to get to see him.” What did he mean by that? Has something been scheduled here?
MR. SULLIVAN: Nothing has been scheduled. But the President has said before that he’s looking forward to picking up the conversation that he had with President Xi in Bali last year, and he fully intends to do that in the months ahead.
Yeah.
Q Jake, thanks so much. Can you — just following up on that point — give us a sense of the timing? Do you think that that conversation might take place in the coming weeks, in the coming months?
MR. SULLIVAN: I can’t give you a sense of timing today.
Q Okay. On North Korea, very quickly. There are obviously reports that Kim Jong Un could be poised to visit Russia. This comes as the White House has recently said arms negotiations between North Korea and Russia were, quote, “actively advancing.” What is the latest assessment of the state of play between those two countries?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, “actively advancing” captures it well. Our current analysis is that discussions between North Korea and Russia, with respect to North Korea providing military support to Russia for its war in Ukraine — that those discussions are actively advancing.
Most recently, we saw the defense minister of Rus- — Russia, Sergei Shoigu, make a trip to Pyongyang, in essence to ask for weapons.
And we also have information, as we have indicated publicly, that North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, has some expectation that those discussions will continue as we go forward — including leader-level discussions, perhaps even in-person leader-level discussions.
Now, I can’t get into all the details of what we know. But at the broad parameters, that is what we are seeing: ongoing discussions and discussions where we have information that the leadership of North Korea sees this as potentially leading to leader-level engagement.
And I would just add that we have been discussing publicly the possibility of North Korea supplying weapons to Russia for quite some time. And the reason why that there — there is such an intense effort on the part of Moscow to generate this kind of support from North Korea is that we have continued to squeeze North K- — Russia’s defense industrial base, and they are now going about looking to whatever source they can find for things like artillery ammunition.
That’s what we see going on now. And we will continue to call it out.
And we will continue to call on North Korea to abide by its public commitments not to supply weapons to Russia that will end up killing Ukrainians.
Q And any indication they’re listening to those very public warnings that you’ve been issuing?
MR. SULLIVAN: Over time, we have not seen them actively supply large amounts of munitions or other military capacity to Russia for the war in Ukraine. I cannot predict to you what will happen at the end of this.
I can only say that the discussions have been actively advancing and the Russians have imbued them with an increased intensity, as reflected in the fact that their defense minister — their number-one guy in their defense establishment — actually got on a plane and flew to Pyongyang to try to push this forward.
Yeah.
Q Jake, just — I wanted to talk to you about G20 for a second. But — but just to follow up on North Korea, could we get a little bit more analysis of how you think this is benefiting the North Koreans or what they want out of this?
Do you think that part of this has to do with them getting less than they — they want from their traditional patron in Beijing? Do you think that the U.S. has any leverage, in terms of what it can do here — in terms of either providing food aid to the North Koreans or ratcheting up sanctions?
Where’s the — the room for movement there?
MR. SULLIVAN: So, I can’t speculate on North Korea’s motives.
What I can say is this: Providing weapons to Russia for use on the battlefield to attack grain silos and the heating infrastructure of major cities as we head into winter to try to conquer territory that belongs to another sovereign nation — this is not going to reflect well on North Korea, and they will pay a price for this in the international community.
We have also imposed sanctions — specific, targeted sanctions to try to disrupt any effort to use North Korea as a conduit or as a source for weapons going to Russia. We did so as recently as mid-August. And we have continued to convey privately as well as publicly to the North Koreans — and asked allies and partners to do the same — our view that they should abide by their publicly stated commitments that they’re not going to provide these weapons.
What has changed in their calculus is not something that I can speak to. That’s in the mind of Kim Jong Un. And he obviously will be the ultimate decisionmaker.
But we will continue to look for opportunities to dissuade the North Koreans from taking this step, to get others to do the same, and to report to the world what we are seeing in terms of the actively advancing discussions that are taking place between these two countries.
Q And then, on G20, just cognizant of the fact that the State Department has blistering human rights reports out on both of the countries that Biden is going to — India and Vietnam — including passages about their restrictions on freedom of expression for the media, threats of violence, arrests, this sort of thing — is that something that the U.S. journalists who are traveling with Biden should expect? And are you taking any actions to ensure their safety ahead of that trip?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, first of all, the ability of the American press traveling with President Biden to be able to go to the G20 and cover the G20 in an unencumbered way is something that has been a serious priority for this White House, for me personally, as recently as just this morning.
- And we are putting our money where our mouth is in terms of making sure that American press will have all of the access that they need and are entitled to as members of the international press, as members of the White House press.
Secondly, President Biden himself has spoken to questions related to democracy and human rights as recently as the state visit earlier this year. The United States, our position on these issues is clear. It is reflected in the statements of our president. It is, of course, reflected in the reports that you’re referring to.
And when it comes to the trip to Vietnam, we believe that we have a powerful opportunity to advance our partnership in a way that will deliver for the American people and will deliver broader security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. But we also always raise issues related to freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and other basic human rights that are at the core of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This trip will be no exception to that.
Yeah. . .[ ]
MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah.
Q — real quick, on the G20. My colleague asked the China question. But is the President scheduled to meet with Mohammed bin Salman or Erdoğan or any of these other leaders that we might be interested in while he’s there?
MR. SULLIVAN: (Laughs.) I don’t know who — I laugh because I don’t know who fits on the list of who you might be interested in.
Q We’re interested in everyone, but those are the two. (Laughter.)
MR. SULLIVAN: It’s like there are two categories: the ones you’re not interested in and the ones you are interested in.
Q We’re interested in all of them. I’m the State Department nerd. I’m interested in all of them.
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay.
Q However, those two specifically.
MR. SULLIVAN: All right. We don’t have bilaterals scheduled with either of those two leaders at this time. I’m not going to speak to how the schedule will shape up over the course of the coming days.
And as you know, there is a certain dynamic element to this, which is all of these leaders in a very confined space with time on the margins. So, some of the bilateral engagements, as you saw last year in Indonesia, will likely be announced at the last minute. And we will do our darndest to make sure that they are done in a way where the U.S. press has the ability to participate in them.
Yeah.
Q Thank you. The Bali Communiqué said that most members of the G20 condemned the war in Ukraine. What progress has been made in the last 10 months to get India and China on board with that position?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, first of all, India signed on to the statement — most members. It was, as I recall, Russia who was the main objector to the proposition that so many of the other members of the G20 signed on to.
I don’t expect that Russia is going to flip its position on the Ukraine war this year.
So, to get absolute consensus on a statement on Ukraine is challenging because you’ve got Russia seated at the table, albeit not at the leader level because Putin isn’t going to be there.
But the fact that most members of the G20 — as most members of the U.N. General Assembly — continue to hold the position that Russia’s war was illegal, in violation of the U.N. Charter, and that this war must end on terms consistent with the U.N. Charter — that is the result of months of hard diplomacy by the United States and our partners, and it continues to reflect where international sentiment is on this issue.
Q And what assurances has the administration received from Congress that the U.S. will be able to continue funding Ukraine’s defenses going forward?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, we are working closely with the Congress, as you know, right now, on a supplemental funding package that the President has submitted seeking funding through the end of the year.
We’ve been working with both the Senate and the House. We’ve had constructive conversations on a bipartisan basis in both chambers. We believe we will be able to secure the necessary funding as we go forward.
I’m not going to speak to assurances per se, but the conversations have been constructive, they’ve been positive, they’ve been substantive. And — and we anticipate being able to work our way through to a sound package so that Ukraine can get what it needs.
Yeah.
Q Thanks, Jake. On World Bank reforms. On the one hand, you’ve talked about it not being about a specific country, that it’s not about China. On another hand, though, you have said that you need an alternative to the, quote, “coercive and unsustainable lending through the Belt and Road Initiative.”
So, I — I mean, how can it be about China and not be about China at the same time?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, we believe that there should be high-standard, noncoercive lending options available to low- and middle-income countries. That’s a fact.
It’s also a fact that World Bank reform is not about China, in no small part because China is a shareholder in the World Bank. So, growing the size, relevance, capacity of the World Bank to deliver for low- and middle-income countries is not against China. It’s for the entire international community, all of the shareholders of the World Bank — China being one of them.
And we believe that just as the United States would benefit from a more stable, more capable set of low- and middle-income countries being able to deal with their own problems with help from the World Bank and the IMF, China would benefit from that too.
Q But there is — there is at least a part of it that is focused on China — on those coercive practices, on those reforms?
MR. SULLIVAN: This is an affirmative agenda. It is an agenda about providing high standards — transparent, sustainable, resilient funding streams to countries that cut through the red tape and give not just the poorest countries in the world, but middle-income countries who are dealing with the stresses of climate and COVID and migration and — and the war in Ukraine access to capital that they can actually take advantage of and put to work.
That’s not against anybody. That is not a negative agenda. That is an affirmative agenda, a positive agenda, and one that’s been embraced not just by the United States, not just by our closest allies, but by a very wide range and diverse set of countries. And we believe it will be embraced by the G20 as a whole when we go to New Delhi.
Q And if I may, just finally, you mentioned China being the third-largest shareholder. How does it impact that Xi Jinping won’t be at the table when you’re asking for various reforms? Does it — does it change the pitch at all or how does — how does that — how does that change with them not being there?
MR. SULLIVAN: It won’t change our pitch. And — and, you know, our pitch has been consistent working into the summit. President Biden will reinforce it. China will have representatives at the table, al- — albeit not represented at the leader level. But the United States is going to put forward the same straightforward, in our view, clear-cut case for why this is so important.
And more importantly, we’ll also put on the table the fact that we are asking the Congress for financing to be able to make sure that the United States is not just talking the talk, but we’re actually walking the walk.
Yeah.
Q Thank you, Jake. Two on the Saudi announcement today, and then one on China. On the Saudi announcement to extend the supply of oil curbs, can you talk to us about what that means to you geopolitically, how serious it is for the global oil market? We saw crude go above $90 a barrel today.
And then separately, does that up the ante for meeting with the Saudis at fora like the G20 where you want to do big things with (inaudible) as you mentioned?
MR. SULLIVAN: So, on the first question, I’ll leave it to others to speak to the specific oil market impacts. I would point out that what was announced today was a continuation of an existing policy, not a new set of cuts — just a continuation of those cuts for three months as opposed to for one month.
So, as far as I’m concerned, the most important thing that the President is focused on is just trying to do everything within his toolkit to be able to get lower prices for consumers at the gas pump in the United States. It’s really the price of a gallon of gas for the American consumer, not the — the question of which country is doing what, here or there, that is going to be his ultimate metric for whether we’re succeeding or not.
Secondly, as I said before, we don’t currently have bilateral meetings scheduled at the G20 to announce with any leaders. I don’t think that the announcement today is going to move us one way or another in terms of engaging with leaders at the G20.
So, you know, we’ll make our decisions on that — on the basis of a far broader set of considerations than — than any one policy.
Q Does that change the calculation at all though for communications in the future with the Saudis? I mean, does it make it more pressing to engage with them on this issue?
MR. SULLIVAN: We have, obviously, regular engagement with the Saudis at multiple levels — with their energy minister, with their leadership — and that will continue. And we will make sure that they understand where we stand, and we will come to understand where they stand as well.
And the thing that we ultimately stand for is a stable, effective supply of energy to the global markets so that we can in fact deliver relief to consumers at the pump and also that we do this in a way that is consistent with the energy transition over time.
Q Just one quick one on China —
Q In the back, Jake?
Q — as my Bloomberg colleagues reported that Huawei has reached a breakthrough with its new smartphone and shows it’s using the most advanced chips produced by Chinese chipmaker SMIC. I’m wondering how concerned you are about this development. And does it prove that the U.S. export controls are failing or that they’re violating those export controls?
MR. SULLIVAN: I’m going to withhold comment on the particular chip in question until we get more information about precisely its character and composition.
And for my — from my perspective though, what it tells us, regardless, is that the United States should continue on its course of a “small yard, high fence” set of technology restrictions focused narrowly on national security concerns, not on the broader question of commercial decoupling. That is where our emphasis has been. That’s where it’s going to continue, sort of, regardless of the outcome.
But in terms of characterizing the chip in question, that’s something that we need to gain more information from before we make any definitive comments on it.
Yeah.
Q Jake, thank you. Do you see division between India and China affecting cooperation, especially with the climate issue in the summit, and ultimately affecting the — perhaps the results that could be achieved from the summit?
And second, if you allow me: Today, Secretary Blinken spoke to both the Israeli Prime Minister and the Palestinian President. Should we read into this as more than just a routine call and maybe a series of steps towards normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia? And will the President meet with the Crown Prince at this summit? Thank you.
MR. SULLIVAN: I think I’ve answered your last question.
With respect to Secretary Blinken’s calls, I wouldn’t describe them as “run of the mill” or “routine.” He speaks with these leaders occasionally, but not every month. But it also does not portend any imminent breakthrough or action with respect to the question of normalization.
It’s an important moment for a check-in at a high level, and Secretary Blinken is well poised to do that, given his relationships with both men and the central role that he is playing in efforts to explore whether in fact a broader normalization is possible.
But beyond that, I won’t characterize the call.
As far as the question of tensions between India and China affecting the summit: Really, that’s up to China. If China wants to come in and play the role of spoiler, of course, that option is available to them.
What I think that the chair, India, will encourage them to do, what we — the United States — and every other member — virtually every other member in the G20 will do is encourage them to come in in a constructive way on climate, on multilateral development bank reform, on debt relief, on technology, and set aside the geopolitical questions and really focus on problem-solving and delivering for the developing countries.
Yeah.
Q Thank you. Thank you, Jake. I have two questions. Recently, North Korea and Kim Jong Un said that it had tested tactical nuclear weapons by launching missiles. How is the U.S. analyzing this?
Second question is: Defense Minister — I mean Russia Defense Minister Shoigu said that the North Korea-Russia maritime joint military exercises are possible. How are you concerned about this?
MR. SULLIVAN: We’re staying in close consultation with both South Korea and Japan on the question of North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities. I don’t have a specific comment on their most recent characterization. They’re prone to making a lot of statements of a lot of different flavors.
We’re just studying each of their individual tests and making determinations about their capabilities accordingly. And then we’re responding to that through increasingly tight and interconnected trilateral cooperation, as most recently evidenced in the President’s summit with President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida at Camp David.
And then, with respect to the comments by — by Shoigu on the — the military exercises: As far as I’m concerned, Russia looking to do more military exercises with North Korea, that’s their business if they should choose to do so.
I think if you look at the broader pattern of activity across the Indo-Pacific — the security cooperation; the exercises; the work together on trying to ensure a secure, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific — what the United States has done with a broad network of allies and partners, I believe, has enhanced the stability and security of that region.
And the year 2023 has been a year of substantial progress in that regard, delivered by President Biden — from our relationship with India to Southeast Asia, to Australia, to the Pacific Islands, and then, of course, to Korea and Japan.
So we’re quite hopeful about the progress we have made in enhancing our own deterrent capability, our own security and prosperity. And we’ll let other countries and the relationships they’re developing speak for themselves.
Yeah.
Q Thanks. Brett McGurk is in Riyadh, and so are Palestinian negotiators. Can you update us at all on Saudi-Israel-U.S. diplomacy talks? And then I have a quick follow-up.
MR. SULLIVAN: So, Brett’s trip this time is focused on a set of broader regional issues. One of the main things that has brought him there, along with Barbara Leif, the Assistant Secretary of State of Near East Affairs, and Tim Lenderking, our Special Envoy for Yemen, is to talk about the war in Yemen.
We are entering either our 17th or 18 month — 18th month of a truce — the longest period of peace in Yemen in years — which has been delivered in part through painstaking U.S. diplomacy. We not only want to keep that going, we want to deepen it and get to a permanent peace in Yemen. And that’s one of the main reasons that Brett is there.
He’ll also be meeting with the Crown Prince of Bahrain in advance of his trip here next week.
And then, of course, he will speak to the Palestinians about the whole range of issues relative to the Israeli-Palestinian file.
Normalization will be one of the topics on the agenda, but it’s not the main thrust of this trip. And like I said before, with respect to the phone call Secretary Blinken made today, we don’t expect any imminent announcements or breakthroughs in the period ahead.
Q Does the admin- — just want to follow up — does the administration support Palestinians’ public demand, though, that they’ll accept nothing less than statehood?
MR. SULLIVAN: I’m not going to negotiate from the podium on the question of normalization, how the various pieces fit together.
Yeah.
Q Jake, it seems like every administration, when it gets into office, complains about the problems it inherits from the previous administration. But how do you defend this administration’s role with issues like Russia, China, North Korea, Iran? It seems like, in all of those cases, our relationship is worse than it was before?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, first of all, Russia decided to launch a massive land war in Ukraine. The United States has mobilized not just the West but a coalition of dozens of countries. And more than 140 countries have voted for a U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning what Russia did.
If you look at the U.S. leadership in that regard, we have stopped Russia from being able to take over a sovereign state. We have ensured that Ukraine will continue as a viable, free, sovereign democracy out into the future, you know, in the support we have given to the brave and courageous Ukrainians out there on the frontlines.
I think the story of how the U.S. has stood up to Russia and galvanized the world to do so is a significant achievement of President Biden and one that we expect to continue.
With respect to China, I’m not sure I’d agree with your characterization of the previous administration. But I’m not interested in comparisons. We’re taking our own approach on this, which is to ensure that we compete intensively to put the United States in the strongest position possible while, at the same time, managing that competition so that it doesn’t tip over into conflict. We believe we are managing the competition effectively.
And from the question of what we inherited to where we are today, if you look at the U.S. economy and you look at China’s economy, if you look at the U.S.’s alliances and the strength that we have built up in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, we feel very good about the strategic position of the United States, in terms of the — the unfolding competition.
With respect to Iran, I would just point out that, under the administration before the previous guy, Iran’s nuclear program was in a box. The last guy let it out of the box. We are now trying to manage the results of that decision. And we are doing so while deterring Iran from going for a nuclear weapon. And we have thus far been able to do that. It’s something we remain vigilant about every day.
And finally, with respect to North Korea, the previous administration believed that if it simply engaged in summit-level diplomacy, it could end North Korea’s missile and nuclear program.
By the time we took office, North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs had accelerated dramatically. The most important breakthrough we had seen from them — the first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile — that didn’t happen on Joe Biden’s watch; that happened before he came to office.
So, we are dealing with the inheritance not just of the last administration but multiple administrations on North Korea. And we are doing so in a way where we have drawn more closely together the U.S., Japan, and Korea in a historic summit that has strengthened our capacity to deter and defend the interests of the United States and our allies and partners going forward.
So, if you look at the overall position of the United States as it relates to those four countries, as it relates to our broader alliances and partnerships, and as it relates to the underlying sources of national strength — our manufacturing, our infrastructure, our technology — all of this, we believe, we will leave better than we found it by the time President Biden exits this office.
Yeah.
Q Thanks, Jake. I wanted to return to the Ukraine supplemental. And you said that you believe that you’ll be able to secure the necessary funding.
I was hoping you could talk a little bit about why you believe that and whether it’s getting harder to — to get those supplementals through Congress, and also why the administration doesn’t do more to sell the American public on the need for those requests.
MR. SULLIVAN: So, you know, on the first question, our view is that the strong bipartisan support for Ukraine in the Congress — in both the House and the Senate — has been on evidence, has been on display, not just in the past votes for Ukraine funding but in the current public statements of critical members of both parties in really important positions in the Senate, as well as key chairs of committees in the House.
And so, we believe that there is still — while there are some dissonant voices — a strong core, on a bipartisan basis, of support for ensuring that we continue to provide Ukraine with the support that it needs because it’s fundamentally in America’s national interest to do so.
And with the question of — quote, unquote — “selling it,” the President has made clear repeatedly since this conflict began what the stakes are for the American people: that letting Russia run roughshod over Ukraine would put Europe at risk.
And we know what happens when a marauding, aggressive, hostile power places the continent of Europe at military risk. It comes at much greater cost, not just in American treasure but in American lives later. And so, let’s make the investments now to ensure we uphold the fundamental rules of the international order.
The President has made that case repeatedly. We believe, if you actually look at where public attitudes are, that they have been surprisingly resilient, despite the constant assertion that they’re — the bottom is going to fall out from underneath them.
And similarly, we believe support will hold up in the Congress for us to be able to continue to provide Ukraine with the support that it needs.
But we don’t take that for granted. That’s something we need to go work at every day — consult with members, ensure we’re answering their questions, ensure accountability for every dollar that’s spent, ensure that our allies and partners are stepping up and doing the burden-sharing so that they’re carrying their fair share of the load. We’re doing all of those things, too.
And I think in a dynamic discussion with the Congress, we believe that we can secure a good funding package when all is said and done.
Q And you feel like support is still steady, rather than eroding, in terms of monetary support for Ukraine?
MR SULLIVAN: What I will say is: We believe that there is still a strong base of bipartisan support in the Congress to pass a material package that Ukraine needs to be able to not just sustain its gains on the battlefield but also to ensure that those gains can be consolidated and not rolled back as we go forward.
Yeah.
Q Thanks, Jake. A member of your team said in recent days that the administration is actively negotiating with the Maduro regime in Venezuela about exchanging sanctions relief for concrete steps toward democratic elections. Do you believe that Maduro has any actual interest in democratic elections?
MR. SULLIVAN: Look, I’m not going to speak to promises, pledges, hopes for the future. The administration’s position has been clear and consistent for a long time: We’re prepared to engage in discussions about specific sanctions relief in return for concrete steps that lead us towards a free and fair election.
So, our measurement is not about promises. It’s not about what we get on the come; it is about getting clear, concrete benchmarks and steps along the way.
And I’m not going to characterize any current diplomatic discussions in that regard, just to state that that is our North Star. We’re going to judge by actions, not by words. And that’s how we approach our sanctions relief policy — not just with respect to Venezuela, but other countries as well.
Yeah.
Q And just on Haiti, quickly. With the — with the General Assembly coming up at the U.N., what kind of priori- — priority of it — is it — pardon me — for the administration to pass a resolution through the Security Council that would operationalize a multilateral force in Haiti?
And what kind of force do you want to see? Do you want it to have the ability to actually go out front, into the streets of Haiti and actually secure, you know, key — key ports and bridges, et cetera?
MR. SULLIVAN: What we’re looking to do is to support a multinational force that is fundamentally a policing support mission, not a military mission, and one that is in support of the Haitian National Police, not taking over the sovereign policing capacities from the Haitian National Police.
In terms of the precise operational elements of that — how they will operate physically in Port-au-Prince and other parts of Haiti — I’m going to defer that question, because the experts are engaging to work out what an operational plan would look like.
In terms of New York, it is certainly our priority to get the necessary backing that we feel we need to build for a multinational force and to get the resources necessary. And we’ve said that we’re willing to put forward a substantial investment to do that, and we’re asking other countries to do the same.
Last question. Yeah.
Q Given that you said bolstering the World Bank is not about countering China — in this country, credit card delinquencies have spiked, mortgage rates are through the roof, inflation remains a problem. Meanwhile, the federal deficit this year has almost tripled, and the President wants to increase funding to foreign nations through the World Bank. How is that fair to a citizen in, say, Scranton?
MR. SULLIVAN: Look, I think citizens in Scranton recognize that problems that happen overseas don’t stay overseas. They come here, too, at great cost to working people.
COVID came here from overseas. When there’s massive debt or instability or conflict elsewhere, it has a drag on the global economy, and America is part of the global economy.
So, our perspective is that for a modest investment, from the point of view of the overall size of the U.S. budget, to put into ensuring greater stability, greater prosperity, greater capacity in the rest of the world, that is going to end up reducing the costs and burdens on working people in Scranton or Minneapolis or any of all — your all’s hometowns.
And, frankly, that’s not some novel idea. That has been a bipartisan commitment of the United States for decades. And even the last administration — the biggest skeptic of all of this — made investments in foreign aid because those investments are in the naked self-interest of the United States, as well as being the right thing to do.
Thank you, guys.
Q Thanks, Jake.
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Thank you so much, Jake.
Q Thanks.
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Thank you, Jake.
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