> That means today’s dynamics aren’t really captured by the idea of a
World War III. If anything, it’s better to think about how World Wars I
and II are ongoing, at least in Eastern Europe and the Pacific.
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The U.S. and China are inside each other’s heads, writes Edward Price.
Alex Wong/Getty ImagesAbout the author: Edward Price is principal at Ergo, a global intelligence, consulting, and forecasting firm. A former British trade official, he also teaches at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs.
"How should we think about a world in apparent flux? Is the driving force deglobalization? Or a second Cold War? Perhaps even World War III?
Various thinkers have suggested all three paradigms. But none works seamlessly.
First, take deglobalization. This is the idea that the world is becoming less characterized by trade. If so, sure. Previously normal trade patterns are being disrupted by protectionism, trade frictions, conflict, U.S. concerns over Chinese technological advancement, and so on. But deglobalization doesn’t really explain what’s happening.
This is because global economies remain mutually exposed. It may be that some positive economic links are failing. But the negative effects of globalization are alive and well.
Just look at Covid. The pandemic proved how very integrated our international civilian transport network has become. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine drove up global prices of food, energy, and much else. For better or worse, the world economy remains as one. A closed system can have both positive and negative outcomes. Deglobalization has some truth. But as a new go-to paradigm, it just doesn’t cut the imported mustard.
That leads us to the second idea, the notion of a new Cold War.
Niall Ferguson, one of our great historians, calls U.S. beef with China “Cold War II”. And sure, Sino-American relations are frostier than a high-altitude spy balloon. But the salient aspect of Cold War I, the Russo-American clash, was that it took place between two separate economies.
With the Soviets, the U.S. traded agricultural products and some other bits and bobs. But trade peaked in 1979. That’s why the U.S. could attack the Soviet economy in the 1980s. Back then, we weaponized deflationary pressures by challenging Russia to overspend on arms. We could contain—and then crush—Russia not just because we had more money. We could do so because the Russian economy was separate from ours. President Reagan’s economic exposure to President Gorbachov’s was nonexistent.
President Biden and President Xi, however, share a single economy. Neither decoupling nor derisking, whatever those terms mean, will do anything to recreate the separated economic conditions of another Cold War.
That leads to global wars. Do our entanglements augur World War III?
Maybe. Everyone is wondering ..."
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Maybe. Everyone is wondering. Will Russian President Vladimir Putin push us over the edge? Will China snatch at Taiwan, triggering war? A new report from the RAND Corp. makes for an engrossing read. But rather than World War III, both the war in Ukraine, and the conflict over Taiwan, are continuations of World Wars I and II.
Actually, how far back do you want to go? Russia is challenging not only the outcome of 1991, Ukrainian independence. Russia is also challenging the outcome of 1945, the death of fascism in Europe. Indeed, the outcome of 1815, respect for national borders, is now under threat.
That means today’s dynamics aren’t really captured by the idea of a World War III. If anything, it’s better to think about how World Wars I and II are ongoing, at least in Eastern Europe and the Pacific.
So how should commentators describe this changing world? Perhaps like this. What we’re seeing is the first global civil war. This conflict—hot or cold, long or short—will be fought in a mutually exposed world. We are globalized, in an internecine way. So we are integrated far beyond any Cold War scenario. And we are contending the old European and Pacific wars, not dreaming up a new one. The best analogy is the clash of ideas within a single economy and jurisdiction typical to a domestic conflict. For example the U.S. Civil War in the 1860s. Or the English in the 1640s and 1650s. The victor will write a new moral code. The loser will be wrecked, but remain linked to its former adversary.
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