Given the intense politicization and divisions in America today, the question is whether “objective” analyses are possible. Further, when is the last time any administration made a profound alteration in its national security policy and planning?
The Federation of American Scientists is a nonprofit policy research and advocacy organization founded in 1945 to meet national security challenges with evidence-based, scientifically-driven, and nonpartisan policy, analysis, and research.
After the devastating bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a group of atomic researchers, deeply concerned about the use of science for malice, created an organization committed to using science and technology to benefit humanity. The group they created – the Federation of Atomic Scientists – soon became the Federation of American Scientists in recognition of the hundreds of scientists across diverse disciplines who joined together to advance science policy and counter scientific misinformation.
Over 75 years later, the Federation of American Scientists is still working to minimize the risks of significant global threats, arising from nuclear weapons, biological and chemical agents, and climate change. The organization also works to advance progress on a broad suite of contemporary issues where science, technology, and innovation policy can deliver dramatic progress, and seeks to ensure that scientific and technical expertise have a seat at the policymaking table.
A new world of global threats requires a new strategic lexicon
"Over time, things wear out. Cars, cell phones, hips, knees and other low joints often need replacement. That process applies to words too.
For about seven decades, a common American strategic lexicon has persisted. Containment, a product of the early Cold War, deterrence and its cousin MAD for mutual assured destruction, defense, and the whole family of proliferation — including non-, counter- and anti- — were central to this strategic dictionary. But are they still relevant?
> Containment was meant to keep the Soviet Union from expanding west beyond its borders and those of its satellite states comprising the Warsaw Pact.
> Deterrence and MAD were designed to prevent an existential thermonuclear World War III between East and West. And the proliferation family was to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction. All reflected this bipolar conflict.
Much of that world is gone or has undergone a tectonic change. The U.S. now confronts two main challengers.
1 China is an economic and an emerging military superpower.
2. Russia is an energy and nuclear weapons superpower that has started a war on NATO’s borders.
But containment has not worked. China is threatening Taiwan and is encroaching on its neighbors’ access to international waters. It is expanding its global military presence. And paramount leader Xi Jinping is attempting to become a key global influencer, perhaps replacing the U.S. And, of course, Russia seized parts of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, and it attacked Ukraine last year.
While some might assert that deterrence has avoided nuclear war and Taiwan has not been invaded by China, that is a paper-thin argument. Likewise, nine states possess nuclear weapons, and several more have a short-term breakout potential. What do these realities mean for the strategic lexicon?
First, the old MAD has been replaced by a new MADD for massive attacks of disruption and destruction, by both man and nature. On the latter, the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have caused more deaths and destruction than many wars.
National security must embrace these threats and dangers as much as those posed by traditional state and non-state actors.
Second, deterrence has become what I refer to as “triterrence.” During the Cold War, the analogy of two scorpions in a bottle was employed. Today, metaphorically, there are three scorpions, with others seeking entry. The consequences are profound. Nuclear targeting is one example. Where do, and will, these scorpions target their weapons? And what about the conventional aspects when technology is offering extraordinary capabilities?
Third, operationally, containment needs a replacement. Using MADD, which combines the existential threat of thermonuclear war and the existential dangers posed by nature — irrespective of one’s view of climate change — as the foundations for national security also will modernize the strategic lexicon. The aim of MADD must be to prevent and contain damage to take the place of deterrence and defense.
Prevention and containment of damage assume more active and even proactive policies than traditional deterrence, which, of course, was never designed to deal with the non-state aspects of MADD. This applies to triterrence. Maintaining some balance between and among these three principal powers is essential. And that raises another Cold War term of arms control.
Arms control was crucial during the Cold War in reducing not only weapons but also tensions and the dangers of war by miscalculation. The New START Treaty limits the U.S. and Russia to 1,550 warheads. China is now increasing its nuclear forces to at least several hundred or more warheads and does not intend to engage in arms control. How will this play out under a number of scenarios, including a semi-alliance between Moscow and Beijing or a breakdown of that relationship?
As the Cold War hardened, massive intellectual effort went into strategic analysis and the formation of concepts for the thermonuclear age. It is unclear that a similar level of intellectual resources is present today. The tendency seems to be a linear progression using these dated terms and concepts.
Given the intense politicization and divisions in America today, the question is whether “objective” analyses are possible. Further, when is the last time any administration made a profound alteration in its national security policy and planning? Since the Obama administration’s national security and defense strategies (NSS and NDS), the Trump and Biden White Houses have followed suit. The aims are similar to contain and deter, and if war comes, deter or prevail over five potential adversaries topped by China and Russia.
Will this thinking change?
The answer is probably not. And that will not necessarily provide for an adequate, future common defense.
Harlan Ullman, Ph.D. is a senior advisor at Washington, D.C.’s Atlantic Council and the prime author of “shock and awe.” His twelfth book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.
Source: https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/
These nuclear weapons estimates are produced by Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds of the Federation of American Scientists. Their work is based on the pioneering accomplishments of analysts Thomas Cochran, Robert Norris, and Willian Arkin, without whom this public service would not be possible.
This work was made possible through grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Future of Life Institute, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Longview Philanthropy, the New-Land Foundation, the Prospect Hill Foundation, the Stewart R. Mott Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and individual donors. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
Status of World Nuclear Forces
Who owns the world's nuclear weapons?
Despite progress in reducing nuclear weapon arsenals since the Cold War, the world’s combined inventory of nuclear warheads remains at a very high level: nine countries possessed roughly 12,500 warheads as of early-2023.
Combined, the United States and Russia now possess approximately 89 percent of the world’s total inventory of nuclear weapons, and 86 percent of the stockpiled warheads available for use by the military. Currently, no other nuclear-armed state sees a need for more than a few hundred nuclear weapons for national security, although many of these states are increasing their nuclear stockpiles.
Globally, the overall inventory of nuclear weapons is declining, but the pace of reductions is slowing compared with the past 30 years. Moreover, these reductions are happening only because the United States and Russia are still dismantling previously retired warheads.
In contrast to the overall inventory of nuclear weapons, the number of warheads in global military stockpiles––which comprises warheads assigned to operational forces––is increasing once again. The United States is still reducing its nuclear stockpile slowly. France and Israel have relatively stable inventories. But China, India, North Korea, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, as well as possibly Russia, are all thought to be increasing their stockpiles (see map):
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Of the world’s approximate 12,500 nuclear warheads, roughly 9,576 are in the military stockpiles for use by missiles, aircraft, ships and submarines. The remaining warheads have been retired but are still relatively intact and are awaiting dismantlement). Of the 9,576 warheads in the military stockpiles, some 3,804 are deployed with operational forces (on missiles or bomber bases). Of those, approximately 2,000 US, Russian, British and French warheads are on high alert, ready for use on short notice (see table):
The exact number of nuclear weapons in each country’s possession is a closely held national secret, so the estimates presented here come with significant uncertainty. Most nuclear-armed states provide essentially no information about the sizes of their nuclear stockpiles. Yet the degree of secrecy varies considerably from country to country. Between 2010 and 2018, the United States disclosed its total stockpile size, but in 2019 the Trump administration stopped that practice. In 2020, the Biden administration restored nuclear transparency – a brief victory for nuclear accountability in a democratic country – but then declined to declassify any US stockpile data for 2021 or 2022. Similarly, in 2021 the United Kingdom announced that it would no longer disclose public figures for its operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers. Additionally, as of 2023 both the United States and Russia have elected to no longer exchange publicly-available data about their deployed strategic warheads and launchers as mandated by the New START Treaty.
Despite these limitations, however, publicly available information, careful analysis of historical records, and occasional leaks make it possible to make best estimates about the size and composition of the national nuclear weapon stockpiles. For a breakdown of the nuclear warhead categories of the different nuclear-armed states, and for links to more details overviews of each country’s arsenals, see this table:
| Status of World Nuclear Forces 2023 | |||||
| Country | Deployed Strategic | Deployed Nonstrategic | Reserve/ Nondeployed | Military Stockpilea | Total Inventoryb |
| Russia | 1,674c | 0d | 2,815e | 4,489 | 5,889f |
| United States | 1,670g | 100h | 1,938i | 3,708j | 5,244k |
| France | 240l | n.a. | 50l | 290 | 290 |
| China | 0m | n.a. | 410 | 410 | 410m |
| United Kingdom | 120n | n.a. | 105 | 225 | 225n |
| Israel | 0 | n.a. | 90 | 90 | 90o |
| Pakistan | 0 | n.a. | 170 | 170 | 170p |
| India | 0 | n.a. | 164 | 164 | 164q |
| North Korea | 0 | n.a. | 30 | 30 | 30r |
| Total:s | ~3,704 | ~100 | ~5,772 | ~9,576 | ~12,512 |
How to read this table: “Deployed strategic warheads” are those deployed on intercontinental missiles and at heavy bomber bases. “Deployed nonstrategic warheads” are those deployed on bases with operational short-range delivery systems. “Reserve/Nondeployed” warheads are those not deployed on launchers but in storage (weapons at bomber bases are considered deployed). The “military stockpile” includes active and inactive warheads that are in the custody of the military and earmarked for use by commissioned deliver vehicles. The “total inventory” includes warheads in the military stockpile as well as retired, but still intact, warheads in the queue for dismantlement. For additional guidance, see endnotes below (note: as estimates are updated, they may vary from the printed materials below).
Expand footnotes
In historical context, the number of nuclear weapons in the world has declined significantly since the Cold War: down from a peak of approximately 70,300 in 1986 to an estimated 12,500 in early-2023. Government officials often characterize that accomplishment as a result of current or recent arms control agreements, but in reality the overwhelming portion of the reduction happened in the 1990s. Some also compare today’s numbers with those of the 1950s, but that is like comparing apples and oranges; today’s forces are vastly more capable.
The pace of reduction has slowed significantly compared with the 1990s and appears to continue only because of dismantlement of retired weapons; the trend is that the military stockpiles (useable nuclear weapons) are increasing again.
Instead of planning for nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-armed states appear to plan to retain large arsenals for the indefinite future. As such, they’re in conflict with the objective and spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
All continue to modernize their remaining nuclear forces at a significant pace, several are adding new types and/or increasing the role they serve in national strategy and public statements, and all appear committed to retaining nuclear weapons for the indefinite future.
For an overview of global modernization programs, see our contributions to the SIPRI Yearbook and the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor. Individual country profiles are available from the FAS Nuclear Notebook.
The information available for each country varies greatly, ranging from the most transparent nuclear weapons state (United States) to the most opaque (Israel). Accordingly, while the stockpile estimate for the United States is based on “real” numbers, the estimates for several of the other nuclear-armed states are highly uncertain."
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