Libya descended into chaos following the 2011 NATO-backed uprising that toppled longtime dictator Moammar Gadhafi.

In 2014, the country fell into a civil war that led to it splitting between warring factions.

Nearly10 years later, a political standoff continues between an internationally recognized government in the capital, Tripoli, in the west of the country, that is led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh, and a rival rebel administration in the eastern city of Benghazi, led by Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA), that is supported by some states.

OK that covers only the past 10 year years...

LIBYA'S NEW STRONG MAN

Small-time CIA asset turned Libya's biggest strongman

A US citizen wants to overthrow a US-backed government in Libya. Here’s why

EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND (from earlier uploaded posts on this blog)

Haftar was born in the Libyan city of Tarhuna. He served in the Libyan army under Muammar Gaddafi, and took part in the coup that brought Gaddafi to power in 1969.

He took part in the Libyan contingent against Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973.^[5]
In 1987, he became a prisoner of war during the war against Chad after being lured into a trap and captured, which was then a major embarrassment for Gaddafi and represented a major blow to Gaddafi's ambitions in Chad.
While being held prisoner, he and his fellow officers formed a group hoping to overthrow Gaddafi.
He was released around 1990 in a deal with the United States government and spent nearly two decades living in the U.S. in Langley, Virginia, and gained U.S. citizenship.^[6]^[7]
In 1993, while living in the United States, he was convicted in absentia of crimes against the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and sentenced to death.

Haftar held a senior position in the forces which overthrew Gaddafi in 2011, during the First Libyan Civil War.

In 2014, he was commander of the Libyan Army when the General National Congress (GNC) refused to give up power in accordance with its term of office. Haftar launched a campaign against the GNC and its Islamic fundamentalist allies.
His campaign allowed elections to take place to replace the GNC but then developed into the Second Libyan Civil War.
In 2017, Ramzi al-Shaeri, Vice-President of the Derna city council and lawyers Ryan Goodman and Alex Whiting accused Haftar of the war crime of ordering the killing of prisoners of war during the recapture of Derna.^[8]^[9]

Opposition from the United States[edit]

Gaddafi demanded Haftar's soldiers be returned to Libya, but the Americans arranged for them to fly to Zaire instead.

There, half of his soldiers decided to return to Libya. In late 1987,
Haftar and a group of officers aligned themselves with the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), a U.S. supported opposition group.^[10]^[28]
On 21 June 1988, he declared the establishment of the military wing of the NFSL, called the Libyan National Army under his leadership.^[28] When U.S. financial aid to Zaire was not forthcoming, Zaire expelled the remainder to Kenya.^[35]
Kenya only provided temporary residence, and the CIA negotiated a settlement around 1990, enabling Haftar and 300 of his soldiers to move to the United States under the U.S. refugee programme.^[29]^[35]
In fact, the end of the Cold War diminished Libya's geo-strategic relevance and the CIA funding program to Haftar's brigade was suspended.^[37]

In March 1996, Haftar took part in a failed uprising against Gaddafi in the mountains of eastern Libya, before returning to the U.S.^{[35]
Haftar moved to suburban area outside Washington, D.C., living in Falls Church, Virginia until 2007.
He then moved to Vienna, Virginia.^[35]^[38]
From there, and mostly through his close contacts within the DIA / CIA, he consistently supported several attempts to topple and assassinate Gaddafi.^[39]
He spelled his name "Hifter" in legal documents in the United States.^[38]}

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar has also been called a "Libyan oil magnate" by international press articles. The Libyan National Army under his leadership has controlled the oil terminals of Ras Lanuf and Es Sider since 2015. It is estimated that Haftar's forces had protected the production of Libyan crude oil, sometimes through forceful and illegal means, at a level of at least 1 million barrels per day. Accordingly, Haftar's personal income is estimated to be about 450-500 million USD per month, if at least 5 million barrels per month are delivered. This sum was deemed sufficient to maintain his power base in the region.^[107]

Khalifa Haftar rose to prominence in Libya as a result of his military background and fortuitous alliances.

An ex-officer in Gaddafi's army and commander of Gaddafi’s armies who tried and failed miserably to invade Chad, Haftar later turned into an opponent, participating in a failed coup before spending years in exile in the United States as a small-time CIA asset.

His return in 2011, followed by a series of events and foreign sponsorships, eventually catapulted Haftar into the larger-than-life figure he has become in Eastern Libya today.
After a failed and humiliating attempt to capture Tripoli with direct support from the UAE, Haftar's stronghold remained in the east, where he established control through his Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), a network of alliances with tribal leaders, radical Islamists and other local armed factions with foreign backing, consolidating influence through both military and political manoeuvring.
A combination of strong anti-Islamist rhetoric, pure brutality, control over significant oil resources, and portraying himself as a bulwark of stability in a chaotic region further solidified his dominance in the eastern part of Libya — much to the delight of an international community exasperated by mounting policy failures in the country.

WSJ

Russia Reinforces Foothold in Libya as Militia Leader Retreats - WSJ

Despite a controversial background, problematic records of human rights violations, and deepening kleptocracy, Haftar continues to receive clandestine and overt support from various Western countries, including a recent visit with US officials. . .

Flip-flopping Western policies
Briefly looking back, we can see that Western approaches toward Libya have undergone noteworthy changes, shifting from narrow security-oriented strategies to facilitating inclusive political settlements.
And, when that failed to secure meaningful progress in restoring the Libyan state, the West subsequently devolved toward a messy strategy of pursuing agreements among Libya’s differing factions.
This new strategy erroneously viewed bargains between the fractious and unelected Libyan elites as a makeshift bridge toward the ultimate goal—peace and stability.

This is a grave miscalculation and a deliberate misreading of fairly obvious dynamics at play in Libya.
By prioritising exclusive bargains, the West inadvertently sponsored the entrenchment of Libya’s kleptocratic governance model that has successfully sidelined the building of key institutions and security sector reform.
At the core of this ill-informed shift in strategy was a severe underestimation of the underlying causes of Libya's endemic instability and scapegoating of its political deadlock for a stalled state-building process. It also enabled the meteoric rise of "Clan Haftar".

In a sense, Europe's and the US’ strategy of reinforcing the very instability and criminality it claims to mitigate is not just an own goal for its policy objectives.

Newsweek

Russia Has a Major Stake in Libya's Uncertain Future - Newsweek

It also perfectly encapsulates the paradox of supposed defenders of democracy, human rights and the rule of law openly crowding behind the antithesis of protection of human rights, political pluralism and consensus government at the expense of Libya’s democratization prospects.

This trend readily reinforces Clan Haftar's authoritarian rule. Before its downfall in 2011, the Gaddafi regime was characterised by unrestrained power concentrated in the hands of one individual, with the systematic suppression of dissent and political pluralism while at least maintaining a level of a normal state with public services and security for its people.

Clan Haftar has already replicated this model in its control of the East. Unchecked, Libya faces the real possibility of becoming a far worse form of an earlier era of personalistic rule, suppressed civil liberties, disappearing political opposition, and a monolithic and mafia-like power structure with no regard to anything else other than the Haftar & Sons Inc while pretending it’s a national army.

The implications are grave
Politically, while some level of order might be achieved in territories under Haftar's control, the undermining of an inclusive and legitimate central government could perpetuate instability and unrestrained violence, particularly in contested areas.
Socioeconomically, while resource control might bring short-term gains for certain factions, the lack of a unified national vision could hamper long-term development and equitable economic growth.
Citizens, especially in contested or “forgotten” regions, may continue to face issues related to access to basic services, employment opportunities, and investment in infrastructure.
Beyond Libya, the empowerment of figures like Haftar, with documented ties to criminal networks and a history of human rights abuses, is very concerning. It signals a worrisome precedence for short-termism.
In sum, Western policy towards Libya, characterised by a preference for deal-making with controversial actors like the Haftar clan, is a myopic approach fraught with peril.
A recalibration of this strategy is imperative, one that prioritises the establishment of legitimate political institutions and respect for human rights.
If we do not prevent Libya from becoming a mafia state, the trend will not stop at Libya’s borders but become a norm in its region, and especially the Sahel.

Hafed Al-Ghwell is the Executive Director of the North Africa Initiative (NAI) and Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute (FPI), Johns Hopkins University.

Contact us at view@euronews.com to send pitches or submissions and be part of the conversation.

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On April 14, 2019, Erik Prince made a proposal of a $80 million deal to Libya's militia leader Khalifa Haftar to supply aircraft and other military equipment.

Called the Project Opus, it involved purchase of surplus military helicopters from Jordan.

The plan was designed to supply intelligence surveillance aircraft, drones, armed assault helicopters, maritime interdiction, and cyber intelligence and targeting capabilities to Haftar's forces.
The project was, however, aborted in June 2019.^[79]
The planning, management and financing of the Prince's project was done using three firms from the United Arab Emirates, including Lancaster 6 DMCC, L-6 FZE and Opus Capital Asset Limited FZE, which were using a web of shell companies.^[80]^[81]

Two of these Emirati firms, Lancaster 6 and Opus Capital Asset were linked to a team of private mercenaries and the unique Pilatus PC-6 ISR aircraft deployed to Libya to support Haftar.^[82]

Besides, UAE's L-6 FZE owned a crop duster, LASA T-Bird, which was part of Erik Prince's Project Opus.
A UN report in March 2021 revealed that the Light, Attack and Surveillance Aircraft (LASA), which debuted at the Paris Air Show in 2017, flew to Serbia for maintenance in August 2018.
The UN stated that the 'agricultural' plane was modified to carry some deadly rockets, including a 32-57mm Rocket Pod, a 16-57mm Rocket Pod and a gun pod fitted with twin 23mm cannon under the aircraft's wings.^[81]

Erik Prince was under an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for his alleged involvement in the attempted sale of Jordanian arms to the UAE-backed Khalifa Haftar, as part of the 2019 plan.

Previous investigations had revealed that Prince and others breached the Libyan arms embargo. As per the reports,
Prince worked with a Jordanian royal, Feisal ibn al-Hussein, to organize the sale and transfer of aircraft and other materiel from Jordan to Libya.^[83] Prince’s associate and an Australian pilot, Christiaan Durrant attempted to assure the Jordanian officials that he had “clearances from everywhere” and that the work was approved “at the highest level”.^[84]
However, after Jordan rejected the deal, a meeting was called by Prince at the Army and Navy Club in the US. Also attended by Durrant and a member of Donald Trump’s National Security Council, the meeting had an agenda where Durrant explained the NSC official about Prince's Libyan campaign to support Haftar and asked for the US’ support.^[85]
The United Nations had also tracked transfer of three aircraft owned by Erik Prince to a close associate for use in Libya.
It was also reported that the planes were transferred from Prince’s companies to a mercenary firm connected to him and based in the United Arab Emirates. Apart from the investigations, Prince was not charged with a crime.^[83]

Private equity investor in Africa[edit]

Prince leads a private equity firm called Frontier Resource Group, and until April 13, 2021, he was also chairman of Frontier Services Group Ltd, a Bermuda-incorporated logistics and transport company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.^[37]^[38]^[39]

Frontier Services Group is backed by China's state-owned CITIC Group and Hong Kong-based investor Johnson Chun Shun Ko [zh],^[40]^[41] with the Chinese government listed as the largest investor.^[42]

Prince's ventures advise and support Chinese investment in oil and gas in Africa.^[43]

In May 2014, it was reported that Prince's plan to build a diesel refinery in South Sudan, in which $10 million had already been invested, was suspended. The halted refinery project was reported to be supported personally by the country's president, Salva Kiir Mayardit.^[37]

Frontier Services Group was reported to be paid $23.3 million by South Sudan's Ministry of Petroleum to transport supplies and perform maintenance on oil production facilities.^[44]
Prince sold to the government of South Sudan for $43 million dollars three Mi-24 attack helicopters and two L-39 jets together with the services of Hungarian mercenary pilots to operate the aircraft.^[45]

One of the Hungarian pilots attracted some infamy by using his Facebook page to boast about his daily killings.^[45]

The Economist

Khalifa Haftar is losing ground and lashing out in Libya

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March 6, 2024

IntelBrief: Outside Powers Exploit Libya’s Divisions

AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev, File

Bottom Line Up Front:

Regional and outside powers are working with Libya’s rival governments to advance their own interests.
There has been little evident progress on UN and Western efforts to unify Libya’s political structure through the holding of national presidential and parliamentary elections.
Russia has used its ties to eastern Libya strongman Khalifa Haftar to extend its influence in Africa.
Türkiye and Egypt have backed the contending Libyan sides, but a Cairo-Ankara rapprochement might pave the way to unify Libya.

Libya remains divided between a UN-backed government in Tripoli, headed by nominal Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah and a “High State Council,” and a rival administration based in Benghazi, in eastern Libya.

The eastern administration is formally supervised by Libya’s House of Representatives (HoR, parliament), but it is dominated in practice by the Libyan National Army (LNA) militia headed by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

Over the past several years, a succession of United Nations, U.S., French, and other mediators have sought to persuade the rival groups to agree to a new election law and hold elections for a unified president and parliament. During 2019-2020, Haftar sought to unite the country under his leadership by capturing Tripoli, but his offensive was ultimately defeated by western Libya militias allied with the Tripoli-based government and supplied with armor and armed drones by Türkiye. Since then, the rival leaders have repeatedly refused to schedule national elections, fearful of losing out to their adversaries and forfeiting their power and prerogatives.

Expressing frustration at the lack of a political breakthrough, on February 28, the UN Security Council reiterated its “strong commitment” to an “inclusive political process” in Libya that allows for “free, fair, transparent and inclusive national presidential and parliamentary elections to be held as soon as possible.” The Council also expressed “strong support” for the role of the UN envoy to Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, to implement a political roadmap, including updated electoral laws, agreed by a committee of representatives of the HoR (east) and the State Council (west).

Although still inflexible on the holding of elections, the UN-recognized Tripoli administration is taking steps to establish the rule of law and curb militia strength – a response to UN frustration over the stalled political process and public resentment of the many deaths caused by militia clashes over the past few years.

On February 21, the Dbeibah government’s Interior Minister, Imed Trabelsi, announced an agreement with militia forces to withdraw from the capital and to be deployed “only in exceptional circumstances for specific missions." Under the deal, at least five armed groups will withdraw by the end of the Ramadan period on April 9, including one based in an area where ten people were killed in mid-February. Subsequent to the pullback, according to Trabelsi, “There will only be city police officers, emergency police, and those who do criminal investigations.”

As an endorsement of the Tripoli administration’s efforts to rely only on professional security forces, on March 2, the U.S. Embassy in Libya announced a U.S. military delegation held a week of “productive discussions” in Tripoli with armed forces, ground forces, and navy leaders from western Libya. The Embassy stated: “The United States will continue to engage parties in all regions of Libya to support efforts to promote enduring peace and security, unify and professionalize the Libyan military, and safeguard Libyan sovereignty.”

Despite the steps taken to promote the rule of law in western Libya, the continuing nationwide duality of power enables regional and global powers to strike separate agreements with the two rivals to advance their own interests. In so doing, the outside powers have established lucrative business and illicit arrangements that enable the two Libyan administrations to flourish separately, reducing their urgency to forge a united political and economic whole.

Of particular concern to U.S. officials, the Russian inheritors of the global activities of the private military company the Wagner Group (now rebranded as Africa Corps) are working with Haftar to advance Russia’s push further into Africa. In Africa, Libya possesses the largest oil reserves and gold deposits, estimated to rank among the world’s top fifty.

Its geographic location, linking Niger, Chad, and Sudan to North Africa and Europe, makes Libya of vital strategic importance to the Kremlin. Russian military intelligence (GRU) senior figure, General Andrei Averyanov, who reportedly was given control of Wagner’s overseas presence after the death of its founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, met with Haftar in September 2023, followed by trips to Mali, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Niger.

Some 800 Russian military contractors are deployed in Libya, and another 4,600 reportedly are dispersed across sub-Saharan Africa.

Russian military contractors run three air bases in Libya – one in the oil basin of Sirte, one in al-Jufra in the interior, and one in Brak al-Shati.

The Russian presence enables Haftar’s LNA, as well as Russia, to move goods between allies in Sudan and other sub-Saharan locations and provides Haftar with military leverage he can wield over his opponents in Tripoli.

According to Tarek Megerisi, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Haftar needs Wagner…Furthermore, while [Haftar is] hosting them in Libya, [Wagner] can use its position to prop up operations in Syria, Sudan and elsewhere.”

In addition, talks are reportedly underway to give Russian warships docking rights at the Haftar-controlled port of Tobruk in exchange for air defense systems and training for LNA pilots.

Haftar’s relationship with Russia has also enabled him to develop a degree of influence over the course of the civil war in neighboring Sudan.

Haftar is reportedly permitting bases in territory under his control to be used to ship weapons to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohammed Hamad Dagalo (Hemedti), which has been in an existential battle for power with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) since April 2023.
The conflict has resulted in the deaths of more than 14,600 people, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).
Human rights groups and the U.S. State Department have also provided analysis and documented evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing committed by members of the RSF and SAF during the civil war.

Haftar, his Russian allies, and another RSF supporter, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have not only moved weapons to the RSF but have also partnered with Hemedti on lucrative gold smuggling and illicit mining operations.

To try to counter Haftar’s influence over events in Sudan, Dbeibah’s government has offered to mediate a settlement to the Sudan war.

To advance its mediation role, Tripoli hosted Sudan Armed Forces commander Abdel Fattah Burhan for a one-day visit on February 26. That visit came two days after Dbeibeh and Hemedti spoke by telephone about the need to bridge the differences between the warring Sudanese parties.
Resolving the instability in Libya has become a key goal of two rival powers in the Eastern Mediterranean – Egypt and Türkiye. The two have been at odds for more than a decade over Türkiye’s support for some regional Islamist movements, access to natural gas resources in the Mediterranean, Libya, and other issues. Türkiye has been a supporter of Tripoli, whereas Cairo has backed Haftar and the eastern Libyan administration. Apparently, recognizing that the division of Libya has not benefitted either strategically, Egypt and Türkiye have tentatively begun to ease tensions. Türkiye requires stability in Libya to protect its national interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and to maintain its commercial ties with Libya. The government of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo has, over the past two years, begun to distance itself from Haftar, concluding he cannot win control over all of Libya and that his support for the RSF in Sudan is contrary to Egypt’s interests. Egypt has been a key supporter of the Sudan Armed Forces under Burhan. Cairo also prioritizes the foreign exchange earnings of Egyptian workers in Libya and the potential role Egypt could play in Libya’s reconstruction. Suggesting Cairo and Ankara might benefit from cooperation, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an visited Egypt on February 14, indicating a pivotal moment of rapprochement. Still, Erdogan has signaled that détente with Egypt, and perhaps eventually with Haftar as well, will not cause Ankara to leave its allies in Tripoli vulnerable. On March 2, Dbeibah traveled to Türkiye to sign a bilateral agreement with Turkish Defense Minister Ya?ar Guler under which Ankara will conduct specialized training for the Tripoli-controlled Libyan armed forces. Still, an acknowledgment by at least some outside powers that a divided Libya is averse to their interests increases the potential for the UN-led reconciliation process to bear fruit.