16 October 2024

THE RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR BRIEF Grumpy from Grumpy’s Substack For: 2024-10-16

 


BLOGGER NOTE: To save some space, the entire brief has been modified. . .


Slava Ukraini! In early 2022 I began a Telegram channel aggregating news from a number of sources daily on the war in Ukraine. In June 2023 I began providing a daily draft for the Ukraine War Brief Podcast collecting news from over 70 sources daily, much of which formed the basis of the script. While the Podcast no longer exists I have continued to make this Brief available both on my own Substack and The People’s Media for those who wish to keep up with events on a daily basis.

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ALONG THE CONTACT LINE 

GSAFU Morning Report

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in its Operational Information update at 22:00 on Oct 15 stated that day 966 of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was about to begin.

During the past day, 164 combat engagements took place. Over the past 24 hours, the enemy carried out 42 air strikes, 644 drone strikes and more than 3,300 artillery strikes across the positions of Ukrainian forces.

At the same time, Ukrainian soldiers continue to inflict losses in manpower and equipment on the occupying troops, exhausting the enemy along the entire front line and continue to disrupt the plans of Russian occupiers to advance deep into the territory of Ukraine.


Air Force Daily Report

The report for Oct 16 is in two parts as the attacks continued until around 1 pm.

On the night of October 16, 2024 (from 19.00 15.10 to 07.00 16.10), the enemy attacked Donetsk region with an anti-aircraft guided missile S-300/400 from the TOT of Donetsk region, a guided air missile Kh-59 over Chernihiv region from the airspace of the Kursk region, as well as 136 -ma strike UAVs (launch areas: Kursk, Orel, Primorsko-Akhtarsk - Russian Federation).

Aviation, anti-aircraft missile forces, electronic warfare units and mobile fire groups of the Air Force and the Defense Forces of Ukraine were involved in repelling the attack.

As of 07.00, as a result of anti-aircraft combat, 51 enemy UAVs were shot down in the Sumy, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Ternopil, Kherson, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Chernihiv and Chernivtsi regions.

As a result of active countermeasures by EW, 60 Russian drones were lost in location in various regions of Ukraine, the information is being clarified.

More than 20 UAVs are in the airspace of Ukraine. Combat work continues!

In addition, two enemy drones turned back in the direction of the Russian Federation.

Once again, we emphasize that if you find suspicious objects that look like drones, do not take any action yourself! Report a dangerous find to the police, emergency services or local military administration as a matter of urgency.

As of 1:00 p.m., no attack UAVs have been observed in the airspace. According to updated information today, the Defense Forces of Ukraine shot down 17 more enemy drones, in addition, four were lost in location.

So, overall the final result was, on the night of October 16, 2024, out of 136 strike UAVs, 68 were shot down, 64 were lost in location, 2 returned to Russia, and 2 were hit.


The Russian Border Incursion

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a US based think tank, in its Oct 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment assessed that Russian forces recently advanced on the eastern edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting along the entire salient on Oct 15. Geolocated footage published on Oct 15 shows Russian forces advancing to a windbreak northwest of Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha) during a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian elements are advancing along the Borki-Ozerki line (just south of Ulanok) in an attempt to outflank Ukrainian forces in the area southeast of Sudzha.

ISW most recently observed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade operating near Zolota Nyva (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) as of October 11, suggesting that the Russian military command may have recently redeployed some portion of the 40th Brigade to Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Leonidovo and advanced in fields southeast of Olgovka (both southeast of Korenevo). ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims, however. 

Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed on October 15 that Russian forces’ main goal in Kursk Oblast is to "lure" Ukrainian forces into an encirclement and "destroy" encircled Ukrainian forces. Russian sources reported continued fighting throughout the Kursk Oblast salient southeast of Korenevo near Tolsty Lug, Zeleny Shlyakh, Nizhny Klin, Lyubimovka, and Novoivanovka; east of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka; and southeast of Sudzha near Borki.

Limited positional engagements continued west of the Kursk Oblast salient in Glushkovsky Raion on Oct 15, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian sources reported continued fighting near Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo). Elements of the Russian 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in Glushkovsky Raion.

Russian sources complained about the poor organization of Russian anti-tank defenses in Kursk Oblast, claiming that the placement of "dragon's teeth" roadblocks has led to accidental civilian harm and deaths of servicemembers. A Russian insider source claimed that a Russian first responder who was driving an evacuation car down the road in Rylsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, crashed into the dragon's teeth in the dark, causing severe damage to the vehicle. Russian milbloggers claimed that "dozens" of Russian service personnel and civilians have died in accidents related to the dragon's teeth in Kursk Oblast, suggesting that there is exceedingly poor communication between Russian field commanders, local law enforcement, and engineering troops regarding the construction of such fortifications. 


The Khortytsia operational-strategic group

(Responsible for the northeastern part of Ukraine. )

Kharkiv Sector:  Over the last day Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 2 Russian attacks near Vovchansk and Starytsya.


Ukraine reportedly reclaims territory in north of Kharkiv Oblast, almost entire Russian regiment destroyed

Units of Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) liberated 400 hectares (988 acres) of forest in Kharkiv Oblast, killing a number of Russian soldiers, The Kyiv Independent reported citing the agency on Oct. 16.

The operation was conducted north of the village of Lyptsi, located 10 kilometers (6 miles) south of the Russian border. The village was under Russian occupation from February to September 2022, and was again targeted during Russia's renewed offensive against Kharkiv Oblast in 2024. The time frame and duration of the operation were not disclosed.

According to HUR, Ukrainian soldiers captured a Russian battalion defense area, destroyed three motorized rifle battalions, a Storm platoon, and a reconnaissance company of Russia's Seventh Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment. The units also reportedly took over Russian captives.

"After clearing 400 hectares of forest north of Lyptsi, the situation of the invaders on this section of the front is deteriorating and close to hopeless," the agency claimed.

"The successful HUR mission sets conditions for further ousting the Russian occupiers from the northern part of Kharkiv Oblast."


Kupyansk Sector: Russian Forces carried out 26 offensive actions against Ukrainian defensive positions near Petropavlivka, Kucherivka, Kurylivka, Pishchane, Novosynove, Hlushkivka,  Kolsynkivka, Kruhlyakivka, Lozova and Vyshneve. 7 engagements continue.


Lyman Sector:  Russian Forces carried out 16 unsuccessful offensive actions against Ukrainian defensive positions near Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, Zarichne and Torske.


Siversk Sector: There has been no significant change in the combat environment in the last 24 hours.


Kramatorsk Sector:  Russian forces carried out 3 offensive actions near  Kalinina, Stupochky and Predtechyne. 


Toretsk Sector:  Russian forces carried out 9 offensive actions with air support near Dachne, Toretsk and Shcherbynivka.


The Tavria operational-strategic group

(Responsible for the central-eastern and southeastern part of Ukraine.)

Pokrovsk Sector :  Russian forces conducted 25 attacks against Ukrainian defences in the vicinity of Kalynove, Myrolyubivka, Novotoretske, Promin, Krasnyi Yar,  Krutnyi Yar and Selydove. 1 engagement is ongoing.


Kurakhove Sector: Russian forces conducted 40 attacks against Ukrainian defences in the vicinity of Novodmytrinvka, Tsukuryne, Kreminna Balka, Novoselydivka, Heorhiivka, Konstantinivka,  Antonivka and Katerynivka. 2 engagements are ongoing.


Vremivka Sector:  Russian forces made 2 assaults against Ukrainian positions near Bohoyavlenka.


Orikhiv Sector:  Russian forces made 2 unsuccessful attempts to advance against Ukrainian positions near Mala Tokmachka.


The Odesa operational-strategic group

(Responsible for Kherson, Qırım, (also known as Crimea) and the Black Sea.)

Prydniprovsk Sector:  In this sector, over the last day, Russian forces made 5 unsuccessful attempts to force Ukrainian units from their positions on the left bank of the Dnipro.


TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Nothing major to report.


THE HOME FRONT

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented his Victory Plan in the Ukrainian parliament

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented his Victory Plan in the Ukrainian parliament on Oct. 16, but details of the secret annexes remain hidden, NV reported citing a source in the Presidential Office.

The Chair of the Verkhovna Rada, Ruslan Stefanchuk, received a document outlining these ideas, but without the secret annexes, which contain sensitive information about weaponry.

It is still unclear whether other lawmakers will receive the document with the outlined plan, or if the public will have access to it.

Regarding the secret annexes, as previously reported by presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak, they contain mathematical components detailing the quantity and type of weapons to be provided to Ukraine.

The NV source explained that the secret annexes are not published; instead, they are handed over to some leaders of Ukraine's partner states. Afterward, Ukrainian representatives can provide explanations to their allies.

Ukraine completed all the points of the victory plan, Zelenskyy announced on Sept. 18. He noted that the plan is designed to facilitate swift decisions by Ukraine's partners from October to December 2024.

Zelenskyy's victory plan consists of four key points, including security guarantees, operations in Kursk Oblast, weapons supplies, and financial assistance, The Times reported on Sept. 22.


The Five Points of Ukraine’s Victory Plan

The Victory Plan consists of five points – geopolitical, two military, economic, and security-related – and three secret annexes. President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented the content of the Victory Plan during his address to the Verkhovna Rada. The President’s Office stated on Oct 16.

The first point is an invitation for Ukraine to join NATO. According to the Head of State, the fact of Ukraine's invitation to NATO could become fundamental for peace and serve as a signal to the Russian dictator that his geopolitical calculations have failed.

The second point is defence. It outlines the irreversible strengthening of Ukraine's defence against the aggressor. Volodymyr Zelenskyy mentioned that there is a clear list of weapons capable of sustaining the necessary strength of Ukrainian warriors.

The third point is deterrence. Ukraine offers to deploy a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package on its territory, sufficient to protect the country from any military threat posed by Russia.

The fourth point is strategic economic potential. Ukraine offers its strategic partners a special agreement for the joint protection of the country's critical resources, as well as joint investment and use of this economic potential.

The fifth point is security-related. It is designed for the post-war period and involves, if partners agree, the replacement of certain U.S. military contingents stationed in Europe with Ukrainian units that have gained real experience in modern warfare, the use of Western weapons, and cooperation with NATO troops.


Ukraine's steelmakers fret as Russians advance towards key coal mine

As Russian forces grind their way towards the strategic supply hub of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine, they are also approaching a coking coal mine that fires the country's vital steel industry. Reuters reports

Russian troops have moved to within around 12 km of Pokrovsk, overwhelming Ukraine's stretched defences with vastly superior numbers and equipment. Thousands of residents have fled and key road and rail links to other cities risk being severed.

Around 10 km west of the town centre lies a mine that produces a special type of coal needed to produce coke, an essential element in steelmaking - which is second only to agriculture in earning hard currency for Ukraine.

Metal exports were worth almost $2 billion in the first eight months of this year, according to trade data, money needed to keep Ukraine going two and a half years into Russia's full-scale invasion.

Oleksandr Kalenkov, head of Ukraine's steelmakers' association, said the loss of the Pokrovsk mine, the only domestic source of coking coal, could cause steel production to slump.

"We could make up to 7.5 million metric tons of steel by the end of the year and, for next year, we saw an increase in production to over 10 million," Kalenkov told Reuters. "But if we lose Pokrovsk, then ... we will fall to 2-3 million tons."

The dire warning is a reminder of how Russia's invasion is targeting Ukraine's economy, posing an existential as well as a territorial threat.

The head of the Ukrkoks coke association, Anatoliy Starovoit, said Ukraine produced about 3.5 million tons of coke in 2023 and used coking coal mined exclusively in Pokrovsk.

"We don't know where to get coal if Pokrovsk is seized," he told Reuters. "It is difficult to bring it in by importing; today it is not so easy to bring it in by sea."

Ukraine has several deep-water ports on the Black Sea, but steelmakers would find it difficult to import significant volumes of coal because of military risks and because ports are built for exports rather than imports.

To do so would also push up production costs for steelmakers, Kalenkov said. "There will be imports, of course, but there won't be enough imports."

The most likely alternative sources of supply are the United States and African countries including South Africa, he added.


RUSSIAN WORLD

North Korean troops likely begin arriving in theatre

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a US based think tank, in its Oct 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment assessed that The Kremlin is likely leveraging the recent June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in part to offset Russian force generation and border security requirements—further cementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilisation for as long as possible. Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and Liga reported on Oct 15, citing anonymous military intelligence sources, that the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade is forming a 3,000-person “battalion” staffed by North Korean citizens (the numerical strength is far beyond a battalion’s). 

Ukrainian intelligence sources assessed that the “battalion” will likely be involved in ongoing Russian defensive operations in Kursk Oblast and reported that up to 18 North Korean soldiers have already deserted their positions in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts before the unit has been committed to combat operations. 

ISW cannot independently confirm the veracity of these reports, but Russian officials notably did not deny them on Oct 15. Putin submitted the text of the Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, which both countries signed in June 2024, to the Russian State Duma for ratification on Oct 14. 

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov emphasised in a comment to Kremlin newswire TASS that the Russia-North Korea agreement is "unambiguous" in its provision of "mutual defence and security cooperation." The Kremlin is likely using the "mutual defence" provision of the agreement to provide the legal justification for the deployment of North Korean soldiers to the combat zone in Russia in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. ISW has recently observed reports that a small contingent of North Korean personnel was operating near occupied Donetsk City.

Beyond the legal justification, however, the Kremlin's willingness to enter into a mutual defence agreement with North Korea, resulting in the reported commitment of North Korean personnel into combat operations in Russia, highlights Putin's continued reliance on pursuing alternative force generation avenues instead of committing to declaring partial or general mobilisation. ISW has reported at length on Putin's continued reliance on crypto-mobilisation and the formation of new volunteer formations to avoid the domestic ramifications of conducting a society-wide general mobilisation or another partial mobilisation wave. This dilemma has become particularly acute for Putin since Ukraine's August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion, as the Russian military had to reckon with new manpower requirements introduced by the need to defend an entirely new front within Russia itself. 

Putin's response to the Kursk incursion has been consistent with his handling of Russian force generation throughout the war thus far, however, and he has maintained his unwillingness to counter the incursion more seriously with a wider mobilisation, instead focusing on the ad hoc creation of new territorial defence units, the redeployment of existing units from Ukraine, and the use of conscripts. 

The use of North Korean personnel under the mutual defence clause of the Russia-North Korea agreement is part of the same wider effort. Putin appears more willing to absorb North Korean personnel into the Russian military and resort to other irregular force generation efforts than to call for a wider mobilisation to actually address the combat situation in the theatre of operations.


Russian Lawmakers Deny Ordering Kadyrov’s Assassination

Two federal lawmakers have denied ordering the assassination of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov after he declared a “blood feud” against them and a senator amid a dispute over the merger of Russia’s largest online retailer Wildberries. The Moscow Times reports

Last week, Kadyrov accused State Duma deputies Bekhan Barakhoyev and Rizvan Kurbanov, as well as influential billionaire and Federation Council Senator Suleiman Kerimov, of plotting to kill him. The three lawmakers are originally from Ingushetia and Dagestan, two Russian republics neighbouring Chechnya.

Barakhoyev on Wednesday denied Kadyrov’s accusation that he was involved in an alleged assassination plot. “With Allah as a witness, I declare that I knew nothing about this,” Barakhoyev was quoted as saying by the independent news outlet Fortanga.

Barakhoyev’s remarks, made during a meeting with supporters in the Ingush town of Malgobek, come after Kurbanov issued a similar denial in a video message published Friday.

“I’ve never conspired to assassinate the honourable Ramzan Akhmatovich Kadyrov and the almighty is a witness to that,” Kurbanov said. “I’m sure that time will come and justice will prevail, and those scoundrels who are causing this strife and are trying to incriminate [me] will be punished as they deserve.”

Kadyrov issued his death threat during his first public comments about last month’s shooting outside Wildberries’ Moscow headquarters, which resulted in the deaths of two ethnic Ingush security guards. 

Multiple felony charges including murder were filed against ethnic Chechens involved in the incident and the ex-husband of Wildberries CEO Tatiana Kim, Vladislav Bakalchuk, who sought Kadyrov’s help to block the merger between the e-commerce giant and the smaller outdoor advertising group Russ.

Business news outlets have suggested that the Wildberries-Russ merger into the new company RVB is part of a larger, behind-the-scenes dispute between Kadyrov and Kerimov.

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