Monday, January 24, 2022

DIGITAL BIOMETRICS: Post-Pandemic Surveillance Problems & Personal Data Protection Insecurity

Intro “So, it's fair to say that information that is being collected by some governments for the purpose of combating COVID - Geo-location and time spent onsite -  is sometimes being used for criminal investigative purposes that the user of an app, for example, can't control.”
___
1

COVID-19 Data-Driven Spark Privacy and Abuse Fears

<div class=__reading__mode__extracted__imagecaption>Technologies such as facial recognition and geolocation services that are being used to battle the COVID-19 pandemic are stirring privacy worries across Europe.(GETTY IMAGES)

Privacy Worries From Tech Fighting COVID

"Mobile check-ins, temperature checks and other data-driven practices dominated coronavirus- fighting strategies in the early days of the pandemic. Even as a slew of vaccines and, more recently, pills, have transformed the fight against the virus, COVID-19 contact tracing apps remain a staple, resulting in the notification of thousands of COVID cases across the European Union, according to recent reports by the European Data Journalism Network.

As the use of data-driven practices continues and EU member states toy with the idea of nationwide biometric — which entails physical characteristics capable of identifying individuals — identification, users and privacy specialists alike have raised concerns regarding the privacy of the data collected by tracking apps, as well as their implications for the future of surveillance in Europe and around the world. . .“So, it's fair to say that information that is being collected by some governments for the purpose of combating COVID is sometimes being used for criminal investigative purposes that the user of an app, for example, can't control.”

> “We've also seen in some countries, like Singapore, the collection of location information for the purposes of combating COVID (being) made available…to law enforcement,” says Greg Nojeim, co-director of the Center for Democracy and Technology’s Security and Surveillance Project.

> In the European Union, such fears have become a reality.

Last week, German media outlet Deutsche Welle reported that authorities in a city near Frankfurt used data collected by Luca, a COVID contact tracing app, to contact potential witnesses to a death, provoking criticism from politicians to even the app’s developer, culture4life.

Similar concerns of overreach have been raised regarding Poland’s mandatory Kwarantanna Domowa (Home Quarantine) app, which depends on geolocation and facial recognition to “allow the authorities to monitor individual compliance with self isolation requirements,” according to an early report by the European Digital Rights (EDRi) Network. . .

[...]

“The ‘innovation’ with our biometric data is moving so fast that we've seen regulators not being able to keep up,” says Ella Jakubowska, a policy and campaigns officer at EDRi.

Though biometric — which entails facial, vocal, fingerprint, and even behavioral recognition — and geolocating technologies predate the pandemic, specialists like Jakubowska say they believe that it has provided a window for the normalization of surveillance and biometric technologies. . ."

Reference: https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2022-01-19/contact-tracing-biometrics-raise-privacy-concerns-amid-pandemic

 
 
 
2

Sharp criticism of the Luca app after the police searched for witnesses

Politicians from the Greens and FDP are calling for the Luca app to be deleted from smartphones and demanding that the expiring contract with Culture4Life GmbH – the company behind the Luca app – not be extended. The state government of Baden-Württemberg wants to continue the cooperation.

This was preceded by renewed concerns when the Mainz police had accessed data from users of the Luca app to find witnesses during an investigation. Daniel Karrais, the digital policy spokesman for the FDP parliamentary group in Baden-Württemberg, criticized the app’s data protection and security problems. Furthermore, the Baden-Württemberg health authorities would hardly use the data for contact tracing, and the catering industry would also largely do without.

“As far as the warning and the follow-up are concerned, the Luca app is dead,” said Alexander Salomon, network policy spokesman for the Green parliamentary group in the state parliament of Baden-Wuerttemberg. For the one-year use of the software until March, the country pays an amount of 3.7 million euros, said Karris. The official Corona Warning App (CWA) is a good alternative. For some time now, the CWA has also been offering a check-in function for events and catering.

“Uninstalls the #LucaApp. Immediately. And then immediately use the #coronawarnapp,” tweeted Salomon on Saturday, Karris agreed on Twitter.

The Pirate Party of Rhineland-Palatinate is also demanding that the Luca app contract with the state not be extended for another year. The costs are in no relation to the previous benefit, in addition, the data collection would arouse desires on the part of the authorities, which are not compatible with the Basic Law and an understanding of the rule of law, it says in a message from the Pirate Party.

The current incident is only the latest “in a series of flops in connection with the Luca app,” the Pirate Party continues. “The trust in the Luca app was and is grossly negligent.” Warnings and notices from the party and corresponding notices from numerous organizations such as the CCC were vehemently brushed aside by the state government. The pirates’ recommendation is also CWA – with it, “a widespread, license-free, open and data protection-technically harmless alternative” is available. The Bundestag also recommends the CWA for tracking contacts."

Sunday, January 23, 2022

What’s Reshaping Arizona, New York City And Texas?

Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin meet at Yalta (1945)

This DANGEROUS Drone SURPRISED Everyone

Why the Army’s new Attack Apache matters 🚁

INFRASTRUCTURE DESTRUCTION: U.S. Special Operations Task Force 9

Add this to concurrent simultaneous wars -- Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and more.
Note how excerpts from this report go round-and-report to establish a not-so-plausible denial calling it all the result of "crazy reporting".
And always years after-the-fact

A Dam in Syria Was on a ‘No-Strike’ List. The U.S. Bombed It Anyway.

A military report warned that striking the giant structure could cause tens of thousands of deaths.

"Near the height of the war against the Islamic State in Syria, a sudden riot of explosions rocked the country’s largest dam, a towering, 18-story structure on the Euphrates River that held back a 25-mile-long reservoir above a valley where hundreds of thousands of people lived.

The Tabqa Dam was a strategic linchpin and the Islamic State controlled it. The explosions on March 26, 2017, knocked dam workers to the ground and everything went dark. Witnesses say one bomb punched down five floors. A fire spread, and crucial equipment failed. The mighty flow of the Euphrates River suddenly had no way through, the reservoir began to rise, and local authorities used loudspeakers to warn people downstream to flee.

The Islamic State, the Syrian government and Russia blamed the United States, but the dam was on the U.S. military’s “no-strike list” of protected civilian sites and the commander of the U.S. offensive at the time, then-Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, said allegations of U.S. involvement were based on “crazy reporting.”

“The Tabqa Dam is not a coalition target,” he declared emphatically two days after the blasts.

In fact, members of a top secret U.S. Special Operations unit called Task Force 9 had struck the dam using some of the largest conventional bombs in the U.S. arsenal, including at least one BLU-109 bunker-buster bomb designed to destroy thick concrete structures, according to two former senior officials. And they had done it despite a military report warning not to bomb the dam, because the damage could cause a flood that might kill tens of thousands of civilians.

Given the dam’s protected status, the decision to strike it would normally have been made high up the chain of command. But the former officials said the task force used a procedural shortcut reserved for emergencies, allowing it to launch the attack without clearance. . .

[...] After the strikes, dam workers stumbled on an ominous piece of good fortune: Five floors deep in the dam’s control tower, an American BLU-109 bunker-buster lay on its side, scorched but intact — a dud. If it had exploded, experts say, the whole dam might have failed. . .Syrian witnesses interviewed by The Times, said the situation was far more dire than the U.S. military publicly claimed.

Critical equipment lay in ruins and the dam stopped functioning entirely. The reservoir quickly rose 50 feet and nearly spilled over the dam, which engineers said would have been catastrophic. The situation grew so desperate that authorities at dams upstream in Turkey cut water flow into Syria to buy time, and sworn enemies in the yearslong conflict — the Islamic State, the Syrian government, Syrian Defense Forces and the United States — called a rare emergency cease-fire so civilian engineers could race to avert a disaster.

Engineers who worked at the dam, who did not want to be identified because they feared reprisal, said it was only through quick work, much of it made at gunpoint as opposing forces looked on, that the dam and the people living downstream of it were saved.

“The destruction would have been unimaginable,” a former director at the dam said. “The number of casualties would have exceeded the number of Syrians who have died throughout the war.”

[...]

Perhaps no single incident shows the brazen use of self-defense rules and the potentially devastating costs more than the strike on the Tabqa Dam.

At the start of the war, the United States saw the dam as a key to victory. The Soviet-designed structure of earth and concrete stood 30 miles upstream from the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed capital, Raqqa, and whoever controlled the dam effectively controlled the city.

Rebel groups captured the dam in 2013, and the Islamic State took control during its violent expansion in 2014. For the next several years, the militants kept a small garrison in the dam’s towers, where the thick concrete walls and sweeping view created a ready-made fortress.

But it also remained a vital piece of civilian infrastructure. Workers at the dam continued to produce electricity for much of the region and regulate water for vast stretches of irrigated farmland. . .

> Every U.S. airstrike is supposed to be immediately reported to the operations center, but Task Force 9 had not reported the dam strikes. That made them hard to trace, said one former official who searched for the records. He said a team was only able to piece together what the task force had done by reviewing logs from the B-52. . .

[...]

No disciplinary action was taken against the task force, the officials said. The secret unit continued to strike targets using the same types of self-defense justifications it had used on the dam.

While the dam was still being repaired, the task force sent a drone over the community next to the dam. As the drone circled, three of the civilian workers who had rushed to save the dam finished their work and piled into a small van and headed back toward their homes.

More than a mile away from the dam, the van was hit by a coalition airstrike, according to workers. A mechanical engineer, a technician and a Syrian Red Crescent worker were killed. The deaths were reported widely in Syrian media sources online, but because the reports got the location of the attack wrong, the U.S. military searched for strikes near the dam and determined the allegation was “noncredible.” The civilian deaths have never been officially acknowledged.

The United States continued to strike targets and its allies soon took control of the region."

Reference: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/20/us/airstrike-us-isis-dam.html 

NO CAPTAIN ONBOARD