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That guest network you set up for your neighbors may not be as secure as you think.
Dan Goodin – Feb 26, 2026 8:45 AM 130Variations of the attack defeat the client isolation promised by makers of enterprise routers, which typically use credentials and a master encryption key that are unique to each client. One such attack works across multiple APs when they share a wired distribution system, as is common in enterprise and campus networks.
In their paper, AirSnitch: Demystifying and Breaking Client Isolation in Wi-Fi Networks, the researchers wrote:
Although port stealing was originally devised for hosts on the same switch, we show that attackers can hijack MAC-to-port mappings at a higher layer, i.e., at the level of the distribution switch—to intercept traffic to victims associated with different APs. This escalates the attack beyond its traditional limits, breaking the assumption that separate APs provide effective isolation.
This discovery exposes a blind spot in client isolation: even physically separated APs, broadcasting different SSIDs, offer ineffective isolation if connected to a common distribution system. By redirecting traffic at the distribution switch, attackers can intercept and manipulate victim traffic across AP boundaries, expanding the threat model for modern Wi-Fi networks.
The researchers demonstrated that their attacks can enable the breakage of RADIUS, a centralized authentication protocol for enhanced security in enterprise networks. “By spoofing a gateway MAC and connecting to an AP,” the researchers wrote, “an attacker can steal uplink RADIUS packets.” The attacker can go on to crack a message authenticator that’s used for integrity protection and, from there, learn a shared passphrase. “This allows the attacker to set up a rogue RADIUS server and associated rogue WPA2/3 access point, which allows any legitimate client to connect, thereby intercepting their traffic and credentials.”
The researchers tested the following 11 devices:
As noted earlier, every tested router was vulnerable to at least one attack. Zhou said that some router makers have already released updates that mitigate some of the attacks, and more updates are expected in the future. But he also said some manufacturers have told him that some of the systemic weaknesses can only be addressed through changes in the underlying chips they buy from silicon makers.
The hardware manufacturers face yet another challenge: The client isolation mechanisms vary from maker to maker. With no industry-wide standard, these one-off solutions are splintered and may not receive the concerted security attention that formal protocols are given.
With a basic understanding of AirSnitch, the next step is to put it into historical context and assess how big a threat it poses in the real world. In some respects, it resembles the 2007 PTW attack (named for its creators Andrei Pyshkin, Erik Tews, and Ralf-Philipp Weinmann) that completely and immediately broke WEP, leaving Wi-Fi users everywhere with no means to protect themselves against nearby adversaries. For now, client isolation is similarly defeated—almost completely and overnight—with no immediate remedy available.
At the same time, the bar for waging WEP attacks was significantly lower, since it was available to anyone within range of an AP. AirSnitch, by contrast, requires that the attacker already have some sort of access to the Wi-Fi network. For many people, that may mean steering clear of public Wi-Fi networks altogether.
If the network is properly secured—meaning it’s protected by a strong password that’s known only to authorized users—AirSnitch may not be of much value to an attacker. The nuance here is that even if an attacker doesn’t have access to a specific SSID, they may still use AirSnitch if they have access to other SSIDs or BSSIDs that use the same AP or other connecting infrastructure.
Yet another difference to the PTW attack—and others that have followed breaking WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 protections—is that they were limited to hacks using terrestrial radio signals, a much more limited theater than the one AirSnitch uses. Ultimately, the AirSnitch attacks are broader but less severe.
Also unlike those previous attacks, firewall mitigations may be more problematic.
“We expand the threat model showing an attacker can be on another channel or port, or can be from the Internet,” Zhou said. “Firewalls are also networking devices. We often say a firewall is a Layer-3 device because it works at the IP layer. But fundamentally, it’s connected by wire to different network elements. That wire is not secure.”
Some of the threat can be mitigated by using VPNs, but this remedy has all the usual drawbacks that come with them. For one, VPNs are notorious for leaking metadata, DNS queries, and other traffic that can be useful to attackers, making the protection limited. And for another, finding a reputable and trustworthy VPN provider has historically proven to be vexingly difficult, though things have improved more recently. Ultimately, a VPN shouldn’t be regarded as much more than a bandage.
Another potential mitigation is using wireless VLANs to isolate one SSID from another. Zhou said such options aren’t universally available and are also “super easy to be configured wrong.” Specifically, he said VLANs can often be implemented in ways that allow “hopping vulnerabilities.” Further, Moore has argued why “VLANs are not a practical barrier” against all AirSnitch attacks
The most effective remedy may be to adopt a security stance known as zero trust, which treats each node inside a network as a potential adversary until it provides proof it can be trusted. This model is challenging for even well-funded enterprise organizations to adopt, although it’s becoming easier. It’s not clear if it will ever be feasible for more casual Wi-Fi users in homes and smaller businesses.
Probably the most reasonable response is to exercise measured caution for all Wi-Fi networks managed by people you don’t know. When feasible, use a trustworthy VPN on public APs or, better yet, tether a connection from a cell phone.
Wi-Fi has always been a risky proposition, and AirSnitch only expands the potential for malice. Then again, the new capabilities may mean little in the real world, where evil twin attacks accomplish many of the same objectives with much less hassle.
Moore said the attacks possible before client isolation were often as simple as running ettercap or similar tools as soon as a normal Wi-Fi connection was completed. AirSnitch attacks require considerably more work, at least until someone writes an easy-to-use script that automates it.
“It will be interesting to see if the wireless vendors care enough to resolve these issues completely and if attackers care enough to put all of this together when there might be easier things to do (like run a fake AP instead),” Moore said. “At the least it should make pentesters’ lives more interesting since it re-opens a lot of exposure that many folks may not have any experience with.”
Headline updated to change “breaks” with “bypasses.”
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