Saturday, July 02, 2022

LIQUID BORDERS: The Visual Culture Wars

Somewhere in there: The Monster as War Machine, Globalisation, Migration, and the Future of Europe Insiders and Outsiders, Migration and Insecurity Citizenship and Social Inclusion in a Transnational Era, Migrants, Borders and Global Capitalism, and Border Politics From Control to Demolition

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Liquid Borders: Migration as Resistance

Liquid Borders provides a timely and critical analysis of the large-scale migration of people across borders, which has sent shockwaves through the global world order in recent years. In this book, internationally recognized scholars and activists from a variety of fields analyze key issues related to diasporic movements, displacements, exiles, “illegal” migrants, border crossings, deportations, maritime ventures, and the militarization of borders from political, economic, and cultural perspectives. Ambitious in scope, with cases stretching from the Mediterranean to Australia, the US/Mexico border, Venezuela, and deterritorialized sectors in Colombia and Central America, the various contributions are unified around the notion of freedom of movement, and the recognition of the need to think differently about ideas of citizenship and sovereignty around the world. . .

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> An exploration of the challenges and rich potential for collaborative film archive and music projects

FAMLAB IV 2022

FAMLAB IV is a collaboration between the British Council’s Film + Music programme, the British Film Institute, and Sheffield’s Sensoria festival of film and music. As part of Coventry UK City of Culture 2021, this fourth FAMLAB joins forces to work in partnership with Coventry’s The Tin Music and Arts, and Deliaphonic, an annual celebration of the life and work of Coventry born electronica pioneer, Delia Derbyshire. During the week, composers and artists will take part in a series of workshops composing for archive and screen; there will be public talks from leading artists in the field of film composing, and a public ‘sharing’ event as part of Deliaphonic.

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Video for "Liquid Borders" film, sonic explorations
Oct 3, 2016 · ... public-participatory events, films, installations, and “sound ... liquid borders also marked the ...
Duration: 24:11
Posted: Oct 3, 2016

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Visual Culture Wars at the Borders of Contemporary China

Art, Design, Film, New Media and the Prospects of “Post-West” Contemporaneity

Über dieses Buch

This edited collection brings together essays that share in a critical attention to visual culture as a means of representing, contributing to and/or intervening with discursive struggles and territorial conflicts currently taking place at and across the outward-facing and internal borders of the People’s Republic of China. Elucidated by the essays collected here for the first time is a constellation of what might be described as visual culture wars comprising resistances on numerous fronts not only to the growing power and expansiveness of the Chinese state but also the residues of a once pervasively suppressive Western colonialism/imperialism. The present volume addresses visual culture related to struggles and conflicts at the borders of Hong Kong, the South China Sea and Taiwan as well within the PRC with regard the so-called “Great Firewall of China” and differences in discursive outlook between China and the West on the significances of art, technology, gender and sexuality. In doing so, it provides a vital index of twenty-first century China’s diversely conflicted status as a contemporary nation-state and arguably nascent empire. . ."

READ MORE >> https://www.springerprofessional.de/visual-culture-wars-at-the-borders-of-contemporary-china/19987098

EVERYTHING OLD IN THE COLD WAR IN NEW AGAIN: NATO's "Evolution Somersault"

Failures to establish stability by internal interventions in Iraq and Libya (and Afghanistan) are proof of that old strategy today... if it doesn't work why do it all again??

Madrid summit shows that NATO returned to Cold War-era schemes — Russian diplomat

According to Alexander Grushko, this U-turn began long before the beginning of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, somewhen at the turn of 2012 and 2013, "when NATO passed a principled decision to end its mission in Afghanistan"
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko Russian Foreign Ministry/TASS
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko
© Russian Foreign Ministry/TASS

MOSCOW, July 1. /TASS/. The result of the NATO summit in Madrid have demonstrated that the alliance has returned to the Cold War-era military security schemes, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko said on Friday.

"I think that the key conclusion we can draw is that in Madrid NATO has completed an evolution somersault in its development after its establishment in 1949 and has returned to its roots, i.e. to the Cold War-era military security schemes," he said at a meeting of the Valdai International al Discussion Club.

=========================================================================

On June 16, as part of the business program of the SPIEF-2022, the Valdai Discussion Club held a special session titled Self-sufficiency and cooperation: features of the modern political economy.

The Valdai Club has emphasised many times in its reports that globalisation, in the form in which it emerged in the 1980s, has ceased to exist. Today we are witnessing two parallel, although in many respects contradictory trends. On the one hand, the destruction of the interconnectedness of the world and the transformation of globalisation, and on the other hand, the need for cooperation even where it is politically impossible to continue it.

”The Cold War ended, but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty with clear and transparent agreements on respecting existing rules or creating new rules and standards. This created the impression that the so-called ‘victors’ in the Cold War had decided to pressure events and reshape the world to suit their own needs and interests.“

. . .The United States always told its allies: “We have a common enemy, a terrible foe, the centre of evil, and we are defending you, our allies, from this foe, and so we have the right to order you around, force you to sacrifice your political and economic interests and pay your share of the costs for this collective defence, but we will be the ones in charge of it all of course.” In short, we see today attempts in a new and changing world to reproduce the familiar models of global management, and all this so as to guarantee their [the US’] exceptional position and reap political and economic dividends. 

But these attempts are increasingly divorced from reality and are in contradiction with the world’s diversity. Steps of this kind inevitably create confrontation and countermeasures and have the opposite effect to the hoped-for goals. . ."

=========================================================================

According to the Russian diplomat, this U-turn began long before the beginning of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, somewhat at the turn of 2012 and 2013, "when NATO passed a principled decision to end its mission in Afghanistan." Notably, the alliance agreed back then that it was not for action in the changed security situation, he added.

"All of its military interventions, starting from Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Libya, let alone Iraq, although most of the NATO countries also took part, and finally Afghanistan, led to results, to put it mildly, contrary to the expectations. And back then, NATO plunged into a discussion again: if the policy of expansion has largely exhausted its resource, the geopolitical space has been developed, the European Union and NATO have merged to a larger extent in military terms, interventions are void, what else is to be done? And a principle decision was made to move toward giving priority to article 5 of the Washington agreement again and to begin getting prepared to confrontation with a comparable enemy, including a possible high-intensity conflict," Grushko said."

========================================================================

HERE'S THE INTERACTIVE GLOBAL CONFLICT TRACKER
FROM THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Farther down is a link that was last updated yesterday January 6, 2020
This image is from Wednesday, April 13, 2016

Image result for global conflict tracker animated gif"
Source: https://sysnica.blogspot.com/2016/04/global-conflict-tracker.html

Readers might like to note that almost four years later, most of the conflict are ongoing now:
Explore Conflicts with Critical Impact

 

Image result for global conflict tracker animated gif"
Wednesday 13 April 2016

Link to GLOBAL CONFLICT TRACKER
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Impact on U.S. Interests Scroll down to explore the conflicts:
Critical
Significant
Limited

 

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6th Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve I Quarterly Report to the United States Congress I April 1, 2021 - June 30, 2021

Military Combat Operation Inherent Resolve: Operation Inherent Resolve is the U.S. military's operational name for the International military intervention against ISIL, including both a campaign in Iraq and a campaign in Syria, with a closely-related campaign in Libya.  
Operation Inherent Resolve reached turning point at Ramadi, commander says  | Article | The United States Army
 

28 June 2017

Over 8,000 Migrants From Mediterranean Rescued In 48 Hours

The price of war
Published on Jun 28, 2017
Views: 129
Subscribe to France 24 now:http://f24.my/youtubeEN

FRANCE 24 live news stream: all the latest news 24/7http://f24.my/YTliveEN

In tonight's edition: over 8,000 migrants have been rescued off the coast of Libya since the start of the week; unrest continues in Morocco's northern Rif region; and political tensions in Democratic Republic of Congo have brought Tout-Puissant Mazembe's football academy to its knees.
It’s been a busy few days in Libyan waters, with thousands of migrants rescued in 48 hours
=========================================================================

"An Empire of Lies" --- Recent examples (last August withdrawal from Afghanistan), elections in Iraq + storming of Libya Parliament

IRAQ

LIBYA

05 July 2019

Libya’s Civil War is Becoming a Proxy War

2 Generals who lived and got trained here in the United States - the similarities are striking in both Egypt and Libya are striking. . .
Published on Jul 4, 2019
The shooting down of a Turkish drone near Tripoli and the capture of six Turkish sailors by Gen. Haftar's forces reveals the Turkey's and Egypt's involvement on both sides of the civil war. Meanwhile Haftar’s forces are accused of bombing a migration detention center near Tripoli, killing 44 and injuring 130
Subscribe to our page and support our work at
https://therealnews.com/donate.

AFGHANISTAN

Friday, July 01, 2022

WHEN THERE WAS A 'DOUBLY-ILLEGAL' ACTING SECURITY OF HOMELAND SECURITY

SOUNDS FAMILIAR AND NORMALIZED NOW: It was under Wolf’s direction that a motley crew of federal law enforcement — drawn from Border Patrol, ICE, the US Marshals, and Federal Protective Services — would occupy the city of Portland, Oregon, bathing its downtown district in a pea-souper of tear gas and snatching up its citizens for questioning in unmarked minivans. These brutal yet ineffective tactics were a response to the supposed “lawlessness” of the George Floyd protests in Portland. But Wolf’s own lawless occupation of the secretary’s seat would go largely unchecked. . .

Chad Wolf, the illegal secretary

6.29.22
Governance by tweet. Incorrect paperwork. Total chaos.

By: Sarah Jeong
Art: Klawe Rzeczy
Photos: Getty Images

"Kirstjen Nielsen’s tenure as the head of the Department of Homeland Security was perhaps best known for the family separation policy at the border. The recordings of crying toddlers, the children wrapped in silver foil blankets, the detention conditions likened to “cages” — this was her legacy. Nielsen was reviled by almost everyone from the center and leftwards. Ironically, President Trump himself disliked her, in part for not being tough enough on immigration, and would eventually force her out. 

Nielsen would be the last legal secretary of homeland security in the Trump administration. What would follow would be a chaotic parade involving governance by tweet, a thicket of laws and regulations, incorrectly amended paperwork, and a strangely hilarious internal legal memo referencing a @DHSgov tweet as though it held some kind of binding authority. Seven months later, Nielsen’s eventual successor, Chad Wolf, would take her place. . .

“My ‘actings’ are doing really great,” President Trump said to reporters in January 2019. “It gives me more flexibility. Do you understand that? I like ‘acting.’ So we have a few that are acting. … If you look at my Cabinet, we have a fantastic Cabinet. Really good.”

As flexible as the Vacancies Act is, there are still limits. The executive branch has 210 days — a little under seven months — after a vacancy is created to put forth an appointee for Senate confirmation. By the end of the Trump administration, countless key appointments had run out the clock, with over a dozen government officials squatting illegally in their acting roles. 

Unlike the vast majority of these cases, the question of who was legally the secretary of homeland security was not governed by the Vacancies Act. The infamous 210-day limit that became so widely known during the second half of the Trump administration was not at play. (Although, if it had been, Chad Wolf — who took office 216 days after Nielsen vacated her position — would still have been an illegal acting secretary).   

On April 9th, 2019, Nielsen filed two fateful pieces of paperwork that would haunt the agency for the rest of Trump’s term and beyond. The first was a boilerplate letter written by John Mitnick, the DHS general counsel, specifying that, “By approving the attached document, you will designate your desired order of succession for the Secretary of Homeland Security in accordance with your authority pursuant to Section 113(g)(2) of title 6, United States Code.” (This, importantly, is the Homeland Security Act and not the Vacancies Act.)

The second piece of paperwork was the “attached document,” which amended the succession order so that Kevin McAleenan — a DHS official whose harsh approach to immigration had found favor in Trump’s eyes — would succeed Nielsen, as was intended by the president. 

Unfortunately, Nielsen amended the wrong section of the succession order. . .[    ] But the unfortunate part of being an illegal secretary of homeland security is that the things you do are not legal. Under both the original succession order and Kirstjen Nielsen’s incorrectly amended succession order, Chad Wolf was not the next in line. He had been made acting head through the actions of an already illegal acting head; he was a doubly illegal acting secretary of homeland security. 

The Government Accountability Office called foul on the DHS succession in August 2020. In a reflection of the extraordinary chaos afoot, DHS responded to the government’s own watchdog agency with an inexplicably combative letter calling the report’s conclusions “baseless and baffling” and demanding that GAO “rescind its erroneous report immediately.” The letter was signed by yet another Chad — Chad Mizelle — who was also one of Trump’s actings, an official who was “performing the duties of the general counsel.”

. . .Shortly after the GAO report was released, Trump would officially nominate Wolf for the job. But the nomination itself couldn’t fix the illegal succession — and in any case, the nomination never went through.

For those on the outside looking in, Chad Wolf’s tenure would mostly be remembered for the battle of Portland. Wolf also oversaw an increasingly hostile immigration policy. He suspended — or rather, attempted to suspend — the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. He made sweeping changes to the asylum system that, among other things, would have disqualified many refugees fleeing domestic abuse or anti-LGBTQ persecution. “These regulations aimed to strip immigrants of basic rights to work authorization and due process,” said Zachary Manfredi, an attorney with the Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, who spearheaded litigation that tested the legality of Wolf’s appointment in court.

> Undocumented and semi-documented immigrants — human beings who are declared “illegal” in the mainstream rhetoric of the Republican Party — face overwhelming odds. They are left to navigate an inscrutable legal and regulatory code in a language they may or may not have facility in, often with limited access to legal counsel. Their fates frequently rest on the paperwork they have or have not filed, the declarations they have or have not made. The moment they set foot on American soil, unseen timers begin a countdown. For them, their entire lives can hinge on being able to prove themselves to the great and towering machine of bureaucracy.

> Kirstjen Nielsen had all the help of the general counsel of the Department of Homeland Security, and she still filed her paperwork incorrectly. Years later, the Biden administration is paying for that mistake. Biden’s DHS — now headed by a legal, Senate-confirmed secretary — has attempted to retroactively ratify Chad Wolf and Kevin McAleenan’s administrative rulemakings; federal judges have refused to accept this maneuver. These policies originated illegally, and they remain illegal. Laws matter, and the process matters, especially when applied to an agency that inflicts a mercilessly exacting process on so many people. . .

[    ]  The actions Chad Wolf ordered in Portland in the summer of 2020 stemmed from Trump’s own obsession with “lawlessness,” and Wolf justified the DHS’s brutality by citing damage to buildings on federal property and violence against law enforcement officers.

On January 6th, 2021, a pro-Trump mob would storm federal property and attack federal law enforcement. The next day, Trump withdrew Chad Wolf’s nomination for secretary of homeland security after Wolf urged him to condemn the violence at the Capitol.

There had been a long and predictable lead-up to January 6th, which started with Trump’s refusal to concede and his continuing assertion that the election had been stolen.

After Christopher Krebs, the director of the CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, openly stated that there were no security anomalies in the 2020 election, Trump fired him via tweet. This was maybe par for the course; Trump had spent the last four years purging various top officials at the Department of Homeland Security for being insufficiently hard-line.

This is the third act, in which Chekhov’s gun makes its inevitable appearance. Krebs was the director of an agency that Trump himself had created in 2018; he had served in that position from the beginning. He was also, according to the last legally amended DHS succession order, the real legal Acting Secretary of Homeland Security."

___________________________________________________________________________

RELATED CONTENT ON THIS BLOG Christopher Krebs:

23 June 2019

The New Game of Double-Jeopardy: Offensive Cyberwarfare Attacks on "Virtual Territory"

According to a report by Ellen Nakashima in The Washington Post late yesterday afternoon, offensive cyber strikes were launched Thursday night by personnel with U.S. Cyber Command that  disabled Iranian computer systems used to control rocket and missile launches in response to its downing Thursday of an unmanned U.S. surveillance drone.
The subsequent reaction:Two days later the Trump administration on Saturday warned industry officials to be alert for cyberattacks originating from Iran.

> Ellen Nakashima notes in her report, "The White House declined to comment, as did officials at U.S. Cyber Command. Pentagon spokeswoman Elissa Smith said: “As a matter of policy and for operational security, we do not discuss cyberspace operations, intelligence or planning.'"
> . . . On Saturday, the Department of Homeland Security issued a warning to U.S. industry that Iran has stepped up its cyber-targeting of critical industries — to include oil, gas and other energy sectors and government agencies, and has the potential to disrupt or destroy systems. . .
“There’s no question that there’s been an increase in Iranian cyber activity,” said Christopher Krebs, director of DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. “Iranian actors and their proxies are not just your garden variety run-of-the-mill data thieves. These are the guys that come in and they burn the house down.”
Krebs, in an interview, said, “We need everyone to take the current situation very seriously. Look at any potential incidents that you have and treat them as a worst-case scenario.
 
This is not you waiting until you have a data breach . . . This is about losing control of your environment, about losing control of your computer.”
 
“The reality is we’ve been seeing more and more aggressive activity for quite some time,” he said. “It’s just getting worse.”

All these offensive and defensive actions are a reflection of a new Cyber Command strategy — called “defending forward” — that its leader, Gen. Paul Nakasone, has defined as operating “against our enemies on their virtual territory.” 
The Implications of Defending Forward in the New Pentagon Cyber Strategy
by Guest Blogger for Net Politics
September 25, 2018
Link to the source:
Council on Foreign Relations
 
Ben Buchanan is an assistant teaching professor at Georgetown University and the author of The Cybersecurity Dilemma. You can follow him @BuchananBen
_________________________________________________________________________________
". . . it was hard to know if the intruders were setting up for a significant cyberattack or if they were just gathering intelligence. In light of this ambiguity, and due to some particular operational factors endemic to hacking efforts, nations are likely to assume the worst and not give the intruders the benefit of the doubt.
It seems reasonable to expect that, as hard as it is to differentiate between intelligence collection and attack in cyber operations, it is even harder still to distinguish between defending forward and attacking forward.
If  the new strategy permits U.S. operators to be more aggressive than what the NSA was previously doing, that could have significant implications for escalation risks.  
. . . policymakers and scholars should not pretend that defending forward is an entirely new concept nor one without its own associated dangers.  "

TESTING NEUTRAL MUTATIONS IN YEAST TO TRACK PROTEIN EVOLUTION

So, does that mean it's time to throw out our idea that mutations in a gene that don't alter its protein sequence are neutral? And with it, all the tools we use to study protein evolution that are based on this assumption?

Worse than it looked —

Mutations thought to be harmless turn out to cause problems

Mutations in genes that don't alter proteins can still alter survival in yeast.

<div class=__reading__mode__extracted__imagecaption>Enlarge/ The genetic code. Note that a lot of the amino acids (the outer layer, in grey) are encoded by several sets of three-base codes that share the first two letters.Wikipedia

REPORT TODAY FROM THE INTERCEPT: How the Pentagon Uses a Secretive Program to Wage Proxy Wars

WHOA! The documents and interviews provide the most detailed picture yet of an obscure funding authority that allows American commandos to conduct counterterrorism operations “by, with, and through” foreign and irregular partner forces around the world. . Experts told The Intercept that use of the little-known authority raises grave accountability and oversight concerns and potentially violates the U.S. Constitution. . .

Those programs include an authority, known as Section 1202, that first appeared in the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act and provides “support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” that are taking part in irregular warfare and are explicitly focused on so-called near-peer competitors. Congress has also authorized the secretary of defense to “expend up to $15,000,000 in any fiscal year for clandestine activities for any purpose the Secretary determines to be proper for preparation of the environment for operations of a confidential nature” under 10 USC § 127f, or “127 foxtrot.” Section 1057 authority similarly allows for intelligence and counterintelligence activities in response to threats of a “confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature.”

How the Pentagon Uses a Secretive Program to Wage Proxy Wars

Exclusive documents and interviews reveal the sweeping scope of classified 127e operations.

"Small teams of U.S. Special Operations forces are involved in a low-profile proxy war program on a far greater scale than previously known, according to exclusive documents and interviews with more than a dozen current and former government officials.

While The Intercept and other outlets have previously reported on the Pentagon’s use of the secretive 127e authority in multiple African countries, a new document obtained through the Freedom of Information Act offers the first official confirmation that at least 14 127e programs were also active in the greater Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region as recently as 2020. In total, between 2017 and 2020, U.S. commandos conducted at least 23 separate 127e programs across the world.

Separately, Joseph Votel, a retired four-star Army general who headed both Special Operations Command and Central Command, which oversees U.S. military efforts in the Middle East, confirmed the existence of previously unrevealed 127e counterterrorism efforts in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

Another former senior defense official, who requested anonymity to discuss a classified program, confirmed that an earlier version of the 127e program had also been in place in Iraq. A 127e program in Tunisia, code-named Obsidian Tower, which has never been acknowledged by the Pentagon or previously identified as a use of the 127e authority, resulted in combat by U.S. forces alongside local surrogates in 2017, according to another set of documents obtained by The Intercept.

A third document, a secret memo that was redacted and declassified for release to The Intercept, sheds light on hallmarks of the program, including use of the authority to provide access to areas of the world otherwise inaccessible even to the most elite U.S. troops.

The documents and interviews provide the most detailed picture yet of an obscure funding authority that allows American commandos to conduct counterterrorism operations “by, with, and through” foreign and irregular partner forces around the world. Basic information about these missions — where they are conducted, their frequency and targets, and the foreign forces the U.S. relies on to carry them out — are unknown even to most members of relevant congressional committees and key State Department personnel.

“If someone were to call a 127-echo program a proxy operation, it would be hard to argue with them.”

Through 127e, the U.S. arms, trains, and provides intelligence to foreign forces. But unlike traditional foreign assistance programs, which are primarily intended to build local capacity, 127e partners are then dispatched on U.S.-directed missions, targeting U.S. enemies to achieve U.S. aims. “The foreign participants in a 127-echo program are filling gaps that we don’t have enough Americans to fill,” a former senior defense official involved with the program told The Intercept. “If someone were to call a 127-echo program a proxy operation, it would be hard to argue with them.”

Retired generals with intimate knowledge of the 127e program — known in military parlance as “127-echo” — say that it is extremely effective in targeting militant groups while reducing risk to U.S. forces. But experts told The Intercept that use of the little-known authority raises grave accountability and oversight concerns and potentially violates the U.S. Constitution.

One of the documents obtained by The Intercept puts the cost of 127e operations between 2017 and 2020 at $310 million, a fraction of U.S. military spending over that time period but a significant increase from the $25 million budget allocated to the program when it was first authorized, under a different name, in 2005.

127e-program-chart-theintercept-1
127e-program-chart-theintercept-2-1

Source: Pentagon documents and former officials.Graphics: Soohee Cho for The Intercept

While critics contend that, due to a lack of oversight, 127e programs risk involving the United States in human rights abuses and entangling the U.S. in foreign conflicts unbeknownst to Congress and the American people, former commanders say the 127e authority is crucial to combating terrorism.

“I think this is an invaluable authority,” Votel told The Intercept. “It provides the ability to pursue U.S. counterterrorism objectives with local forces that can be tailored to the unique circumstances of the specific area of operations.”

The 127e authority first faced significant scrutiny after four U.S. soldiers were killed by Islamic State militants during a 2017 ambush in Niger and several high-ranking senators claimed to know little about U.S. operations there. Previous reporting, by The Intercept and others, has documented 127e efforts in multiple African countries, including a partnership with a notoriously abusive unit of the Cameroonian military that continued long after its members were connected to mass atrocities.

For more than a year, the White House has failed to provide The Intercept with substantive comment about operations by U.S. commandos outside conventional war zones and specifically failed to address the use of 127e programs. Asked for a general comment about the utility of the 127e authority and its role in the administration’s counterterrorism strategy, Patrick Evans, a National Security Council spokesperson, replied: “These all fall under the Department of Defense.” The Pentagon and Special Operations Command refuse to comment on the 127e authority. “We do not provide information about 127e programs because they are classified,” SOCOM spokesperson Ken McGraw told The Intercept. . .

“There’s reason to suspect the Department of Defense has used 127e partners to engage in combat beyond the scope of any authorization for use of military force or permissible self-defense,” Ebright told The Intercept, noting substantial confusion at the Pentagon and in Congress over a stipulation that 127e programs support only authorized ongoing military operations. “That kind of unauthorized use of force, even through partners rather than U.S. soldiers themselves, would contravene constitutional principles.”

22096119_1262111187226771_298605369197715840_o-2

A U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha team soldier, likely on a 127e mission, according to journalist Wes Morgan, is seen along with Nigerien counterparts at a Nigerien Army range on Sept. 11, 2017.

Photo: Richard Bumgardner, SOCFWD-NWA Public Affairs

Global Proxy War

The origins of the 127e program can be traced back to the earliest days of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, as commandos and CIA personnel sought to support the Afghan Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban. Army Special Operations Command soon realized that it lacked the authority to provide direct payments to its new proxies and was forced to rely on CIA funding. This prompted a broader push by SOCOM to secure the ability to support foreign forces in so-called missions, a military corollary to the CIA’s use of militia surrogates. First known as Section 1208, the authority was also deployed in the early years of the Iraq invasion, according to a former senior defense official. It was ultimately enshrined in U.S. law under U.S.C. Title 10 § 127e.

127e is one of several virtually unknown authorities granted to the Defense Department by Congress over the last two decades that allow U.S. commandos to conduct operations on the fringes of war and with minimal outside oversight. . .

No Vetting, No Oversight

While the documents obtained by The Intercept offer clues about the scope and contours of the 127e program, much remains unknown to both the public and members of Congress. Relevant reports required by law are classified at a level that prevents most congressional staffers from accessing them. A government official familiar with the program, who requested anonymity to discuss it, estimated that only a handful of people on Congress’s armed services and intelligence committees read such reports. Congressional foreign affairs and relations committees — even though they have primary responsibility for deciding where the U.S. is at war and can use force — do not receive them. And most congressional representatives and staff with clearance to access the reports do not know to ask for them. “It’s true that any member of Congress could read any of these reports, but I mean, they don’t even know they exist,” the government official added. “It was designed to prevent oversight.”

But it is not just Congress that’s largely kept in the dark about the program: Officials at the State Department with the relevant expertise are also often unaware. . ."

READ MORE >> https://theintercept.com/2022/07/01/pentagon-127e-proxy-wars/